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ABORTION COUNSELING AS VICE ACTIVITY: THE FREE
SPEECH IMPLICATIONS OF RUST v. SULLIVAN AND
PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. CASEY
ChristinaE. Wells*

In dissenting from the Supreme Court's 1994 decision upholding
portions of an injunction against abortion protestors, Justice Scalia wrote:
[T]his case departs so far from the established course of our
jurisprudence that in any other context it would have been regarded as a candidate for summary reversal.
But the context here is abortion .... "[It is] painfully clear
that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by
this Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case
involving state regulation of abortion." . . . Today the ad hoc
nullification machine claims its latest, greatest, and most surprising victim: the First Amendment.'
Contrary to Scalia's suggestion, the First Amendment was sacrificed at the
abortion altar much earlier. In its hurry to dismantle abortion rights in
the area of abortion counseling, 2 the Court also pulled apart the fundamental tenets of the First Amendment. At least two decisions, Rust v.
Sullivan3 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,4 squarely presented First
Amendment issues pertaining to abortion counseling, although in slightly
different contexts. Rust involved a challenge to federal regulations requiring that health clinics receiving federal subsidies refrain from counseling about abortion as an alternative to childbirth. Casey involved,
among other abortion-related issues, the constitutionality of a
Pennsylvania law compelling doctors to provide certain (arguably biased)
information to clients seeking abortions. In both cases, the Court rejected or ignored the petitioners' First Amendment challenges. The Rust
majority apparently believed that the federal regulations requiring recipients of federal funds to convey only pro-childbirth information to their
* Associate Professor, University of Missouri School of Law; BA, University of
Kansas, 1985; J.D., University of Chicago, 1988. Many friends and colleagues gave me
valuable assistance on this article. I want to thank Chuck Smith, Bill Fisch, Bob Pushaw,
Michelle Cecil, and Robert Post for their invaluable comments and helpful suggestions. I
would also like to thankJoe Levine, Carrie Mulholland, Bart Zuckerman, and Tom Glick
for their research, editorial criticisms, and senses of humor. I am grateful for the generous
support provided by the William C. Myers, Jr. Memorial Faculty Research Fellowship
through the Missouri Law School Foundation. Finally, thanks to Kent, Ted, and Linda,
who keep me sane.
1. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2534-35 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
2. This article uses the term "abortion counseling" to encompass advice and
information on abortion given to prospective patients by health care providers.
3. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
4. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
HeinOnline 1724
-- 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1724 1995

1995]

ABORTION COUNSELING AS VICE ACTIVITY

1725

clients did not unconstitutionally condition the receipt of those funds.5
The Casey plurality chose to forego First Amendment analysis altogether
and upheld the Pennsylvania statute as a reasonable regulation of the
practice of medicine. 6
Rust and Casey appear to be only superficially related. After all, Rust
involved government subsidization of speech, an area the Court7 treats
differently from the direct regulation of speech at issue in Casey. Most
scholars writing about abortion counseling have focused primarily on the
First Amendment aspects of Rust,8 centering much of their criticism on
the Court's unconstitutional conditions analysis.9 Few scholars have even
discussed the First Amendment aspects of Casey, much less linked the
case to Rust.10 A closer examination of Rust and Case, however, reveals a
common thread running through the cases: the Court's treatment of
abortion counseling as a form of activity rather than a form of speech.
That treatment, in turn, has much to do with the Court's emerging view
5. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-98. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that
the government may not condition a grant or benefit on the relinquishment of a
constitutional ight, such as the right to speak freely. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
518-19 (1958) (noting that discriminatory denial of tax exemption for engaging in
protected speech violated First Amendment); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 11-5, at 781 (2d ed. 1988).
6. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824.
7. The Court consistently distinguishes between direct government regulation of
speech and government refusal to fund speech. Generally, the Court carefully scrutinizes
laws prohibiting advocacy of certain ideas, see Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of
N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959), or laws prohibiting leafleting, see Schneider v. NewJersey,
308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939), although it uses different standards of review in each instance.
In contrast, the Court recognizes a need for governmental discretion in doling out funds
and thus accords greater deference to government funding decisions that affect speech.
See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983).
8. See, e.g., David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675, 679-80 (1992); PhillipJ.
Cooper, Rusty Pipes: The Rust Decision and the Supreme Court's Free Flow Theory of the
First Amendment, 6 Notre DameJ.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 359, 379 (1992); Stanley Ingber,
Judging WithoutJudgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the Demise of Dialogue, 46
Rutgers L. Rev. 1473, 1579-1612 (1994); Thomas W. Mayo, Abortion and Speech: A
Comment, 46 SMU L. Rev. 309, 311 (1992); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the
Control of Knowledge, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 587, 605 (1993); Stephen F. Rohde, Rust v.
Sullivan: Subverting the Constitution and Abusing Judicial Power?, 25 Beverly Hills B.
Ass'n J. 155, 159 (1991); Ann B. Weeks, Note, The Pregnant Silence: Rust v. Sullivan,
Abortion Rights, and Publicly Funded Speech, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1623, 1657 (1992); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 114-] 8 (1993) (considering
the Rust decision in the broader context of unconstitutional conditions and government
funding).
9. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 116-18; Cole, supra note 8, at 685; Rohde, supra
note 8, at 159-60; Weeks, supra note 8, at 1664.
10. For a sampling of the authors who have tackled the First Amendment issues in
Casey, see Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and
the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 201, 213-31 (1994);
Elizabeth A. Schneider, Comment, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 Temp. L.
Rev. 1003, 1024 (1993).
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that abortion is no longer a fundamental right; instead, the Court's current jurisprudence implicitly equates abortion with less-protected economic activities such as gambling. With abortion no longer a fundamental right, the Court more easily manages to lump abortion and abortion
counseling together, treating both as part of the same activity under a
questionable and largely abandoned commercial speech doctrine. This
approach allowed the Court to overlook the free speech implications of
abortion counseling and to forego any meaningful First Amendment
analysis in Rust and Casey. Thus, the Court's "ad hoc nullification
machine" to which Justice Scalia refers has been devouring the First
Amendment rights of women and their doctors for some time.
Part I of this article discusses the Court's opinions in Rust and Casey.
It first demonstrates that the driving force in both decisions was the
Court's characterization of abortion counseling as an activity rather than
as speech. Part I further discusses the speech/conduct distinction in First
Amendment jurisprudence and demonstrates that abortion counseling
falls on the speech side of that distinction. Parts II and III suggest that
the real cause of the conflation of speech and conduct in Rust and Casey
was the confluence of (1) the reemergence of reasoning found in a curious commercial speech decision-Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Company" and (2) the Court's rapidly changing view of a woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy.
I. RuST AND CASEY

REVISITED: THE CONFLATION OF SPEECH

AND CONDUCT

A. Rust v. Sullivan
Rust involved regulations under Title X of the Public Health Services
Act, which provides federal funding to family planning projects offering2
"acceptable and effective family planning methods and services."1
Although Title X provides broad funding for family planning programs,
it specifically prohibits the allocation of funds to programs in which abortion is used as a method of family planning.' 3 Prior to 1988, however,
Title X programs were not prohibited from engaging in nondirective
14
counseling about abortion.
11. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1988).
13. Id. § 300a-6.

14. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a) (2) (1987) (regulation prohibits only counseling
designed to coerce a patient "to employ or not to employ any particular methods of family

planning"); Brief for Petitioners at Exhibit C-2, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No.
89-1391) ("[T]he provision of information concerning abortion services, mere referral of
an individual to another provider of services for an abortion, and the collection of
statistical data and information regarding abortion are not considered to be proscribed by
[Section 300a-6].") (citing Memorandum from Office of the General Counsel, Dep't of
Health Educ. &Welfare (April 14, 1978)); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2923 (1988) (noting
HeinOnline -- 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1726 1995
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In 1988, the Secretary of Health and Human Services promulgated

regulations that substantially curtailed the ability of Tide X recipients to
counsel patients about, and refer them for, abortions. 15 Specifically, the
regulations banned Title X projects from "counseling concerning the use
of abortion as a method of family planning or provid[ing] referral for
abortion as a method of family planning. 1 6 In addition, the regulations
prohibited Tide X recipients from indirectly "encouraging or promoting"
abortion by, for example, providing patients with lists of health care
providers weighed in favor of those who performed abortions or whose
primary business was providing abortions. 17 These prohibitions applied
even if the patient specifically requested information about abortion or
abortion providers.' 8 In contrast, the regulations requiredTitle X doctors
and counselors to refer pregnant clients to appropriate prenatal or social
that regulations in effect prior to 1988 provided for nondirective counseling about
abortion).
15. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.8, 59.10 (1988) (hereinafter the regulations). Soon after
President Clinton took office in 1993, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
suspended the 1988 regulations. See 58 Fed. Reg. 7462, 7462 (1993). While the
regulations are not currently effective, the Rust Court's decision to uphold them means
that they can reemerge without constitutional impediment. In fact, the shift of power
between political parties after the 1994 elections has been accompanied by attempts to
override President Clinton's suspension of the regulations. See Jerry Gray, Issue of
Abortion Is Pushing Its Way to Center Stage, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1995, at Al.
16. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a) (1) (1994) (suspended by President Clinton Feb. 5, 1993).
17. Id. § 59.8(a) (3) (Title X project cannot "weigh[ ] [a] list of referrals in favor of
health care providers which perform abortions, ... includ[e] on the list of referral
providers health care providers whose principal business is the provision of abortions,....
exclud[e] available providers who do not provide abortions, or. . . 'steer[ ]' clients to
providers who offer abortion as a method of family planning.").
The regulations did not merely prohibit counseling about abortion; they further
prohibited Title X projects from engaging in activities that "encourage, promote or
advocate abortion as a method of family planning." Id. § 59.10(a). Thus, the regulations
forbade Title X projects from lobbying for legislation that would increase the availability of
abortion as a method of family planning, paying dues to any organization whose activities
consisted mainly of advocating the use of abortion, using legal action to promote abortion
as a method of family planning, and providing speakers or developing or disseminating
literature advocating the use of abortion as a method of family planning. Id.
§ 59.10(a) (1)-(5). The regulations did not, however, prevent Title X projects from
engaging in anti-abortion activities. As with the counseling provisions, the Supreme Court
upheld the lobbying and advocacy restrictions. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196-98
(1991).
18. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b) (3)-(5) (1994) (suspended by President Clinton Feb. 5,
1993). The regulations provide the following example:
A pregnant woman asks the title X project to provide her with a list of the
abortion providers in the area. The project tells her that it does not refer for
abortion and provides her a list which consists of hospitals and clinics and other
providers which provide prenatal care and also provide abortions. None of the
entries on the list are providers that principally provide abortions. Although
there are several appropriate providers of prenatal care in the area which do not
provide or refer for abortions, none of these providers are included on the list.
Provision of the list is inconsistent with [section 59.8(a) (3)].
Id. § 59.8(b) (4).
HeinOnline -- 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1727 1995
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services that promoted the welfare of the "unborn child" and, in the
meantime, to furnish information necessary to protect the welfare of the
"unborn child."19
The Rust petitioners, assorted Title X grantees, argued that the regulations violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by conditioning
the grant of a government benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutional right.20 Specifically, they claimed that the regulations' requirement that they espouse a particular viewpoint (pro-childbirth/anti-abor2
tion) in order to receive Title X funds violated the First Amendment. '
Petitioners recognized that the government had broad discretion to allocate federal funds.2 2 Nevertheless, they argued that the Supreme Court
had consistently stated that the government may not "discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai [m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.' "23 By conditioning Title X funds on the recipients' willingness to provide only pro-childbirth information to clients, petitioners
argued, the regulations clearly violated this anti-viewpoint discrimination
24
principle.
19. Id. § 59.8(a) (2).
20. For an in-depth description of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see
Tribe, supra note 5,§ 11-5, at 781; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
Harv. L Rev. 1413, 1415 (1989). The doctrine's history ranges back to the Court's Lochnerera decisions, but subsequently has been used to protect personal liberties such as speech,
association, religion, and privacy. See Sullivan, supra, at 1416; see also Richard A. Epstein,
The Supreme Court 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L Rev. 4, 28-102 (1988) (discussing the many
contexts in which the unconstitutional conditions doctrine operates). The doctrine's
history has been inconsistent, with the Court unable to formulate a coherent theory.
Numerous scholars have criticized the Court's use and application of the doctrine. See
Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1293, 1301 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech,
and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. Rev. 593, 595 (1990); Patricia M. Wald, Government Benefits: A
New Look at an Old Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 247, 255 (1990).
21. See Brief for Petitioners at 14-24, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (No.
89-1391).
22. See id. at 17 (noting Congress's power "to earmark federal funds for a chosen
purpose"). The Supreme Court has frequently reaffirmed the government's broad
spending powers. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548-50
(1983).
23. Brief for Petitioners at 17, Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (quoting Regan, 461 U.S. at 548
(citations omitted)). Several other decisions reaffirm the Court's antipathy toward
viewpoint-based restrictions on funding allocations. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84
(1984); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958).
24. The Eighth Circuit faced an almost identical issue three years prior to Rust. In
Reproductive Health Serv. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 492 U.S. 490
(1989), the court examined the constitutionality of a state statute that made it unlawful for
public employees, including doctors, nurses, social workers, and counselors, to "encourage
or counsel a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life." Id. at 1077 n.9
(citing Mo. Ann. Stat. § 188.210 (Vernon 1983 & 1988 Supp.)). The majority held that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague and violated the right to privacy. See id. at 1077-80.
HeinOnline -- 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1728 1995
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A majority of the Court rejected the petitioners' argument and upheld the regulations. Like the petitioners, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
authored the majority opinion, framed the issue as an unconstitutional
conditions problem. 2 5 He also acknowledged the Court's previous decisions holding that government subsidies aimed at suppressing particular
ideas violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.2 6 In addition,
the Chief Justice recognized that the regulations were designed to "encourage" women to forego abortions 27 and that they did so by imposing
one-sided restrictions on counseling and referral for abortion.2 8 Nevertheless, the Rust majority found that the regulations did not discriminate
on the basis of viewpoint. In Rehnquist's words, the government could
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem
in another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely
chosen to fund
29
one activity to the exclusion of the other.
Thus, the Court reasoned that the Rust regulations presented "not a case
of the Government 'suppressing a dangerous idea,' but a prohibition on
a project grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of
the project's scope."30 That is, because the federally funded Title X program was designed to support preventive family planning, the governJudge Arnold, concurring in the result, based his reasoning on impermissible viewpoint
discrimination, the argument espoused by the Rust petitioners:
These statutes sharply discriminate between kinds of speech on the basis of their

viewpoint: a physician, for example, could discourage an abortion, or counsel
against it, while in a public facility, but he or she could not encourage or counsel

in favor of it. That kind of distinction is flatly inconsistent with the First
Amendment ....

Id. at 1085 (Amold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The State of Missouri
did not appeal the Eighth Circuit's decision striking the ban on counseling and, as a result,

the Supreme Court did not decide the counseling issue. See Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 512 (1989).

25. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-200.
26. See id. at 192 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548; Ragland, 481 U.S. at 234; and

Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
27. See id. at 193 ("Here the Government is exercising the authority it possesses... to
subsidize family planning services which will lead to conception and childbirth, and

declining to 'promote or encourage abortion.' ").
28. See id. at 193-94 (noting that "a doctor employed by the project may be

prohibited in the course of his project duties from counseling abortion or referring for
abortion").

29. Id. at 193; see also id.("'A refusal to fund protected activity, without more,
cannot be equated with the imposition of a "penalty" on that activity.' ") (quoting Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980)); id. ("'There is a basic difference between direct

state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative
activity consonant with legislative policy.'") (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475
(1977)).
30. Id. at 194.
HeinOnline -- 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1729 1995
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ment could enact regulations barring speech not directed at such
planning.3 '
At first glance, Rust appears to be a straightforward decision. The
Supreme Court recognized that Congress has wide discretion to allocate
funds; that its discretion is limited so that it may not condition the acceptance of funds on the recipients' willingness to espouse a particular viewpoint; and that the regulations in Rust did not do so and were, therefore,
constitutional. In other words, the Court apparently engaged in a simple
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The problem
with the Rust decision, however, is that contrary to the Court's characterization, the regulations were very much aimed at suppressing an idea that
the government viewed as "dangerous."
First, the regulations did not merely refuse to subsidize certain
speech but specifically prohibited Title X projects from counseling about
abortion even if a client asked for abortion information.3 2 Thus, the regulations sought to silence only one side of the discussion concerning legitimate family planning alternatives. That alone should have brought
the regulations within the Court's traditional hostility to one-sided speech
restrictions.3 3 Moreover, the regulations in Rust were not acceptable
under traditional First Amendmentjurisprudence because they operated
only in the context of Title X projects, leaving private physicians and even
34
project physicians free to counsel about abortion on their own time.
31. See id. at 195 n.4 ("The regulations are designed to ensure compliance with the
prohibition ... that none of the funds appropriated under Title X be used in a program
where abortion is a method of family planning.").
32. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1994) (suspended by President Clinton Feb. 5, 1993); see
also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) ("The First
Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech ... because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed."); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.") (citations
omitted); see also Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech And Its Relation to SelfGovernment 26 (1948) (restricting speech based upon viewpoint considered a "mutilation"
against which the First Amendment is directed); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation
and the First Amendment, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 198-200 (1983) (discussing
unconstitutionality of viewpoint-based restrictions on speech).
34. Professor Stone has used the term "modest viewpoint" restrictions to refer to those
regulations which restrict viewpoints only in certain instances as opposed to regulations
which impose an across-the-board ban on certain viewpoints. For example, antipornography legislation aimed at suppressing graphic, sexually-explicit speech that
portrays women in submissive or subordinate positions qualifies as a "modest viewpoint"
restriction. Such legislation does not ban all advocacy of the idea that women should be
subordinate or submissive; rather it restricts expression of this view only through graphic,
sexually-explicit means. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as ViewpointDiscrimination, 9 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 461, 463-65 (1986). On the other hand, a law
criminalizing advocacy of violence against the government is a complete ban on expression
of a particular viewpoint because it leaves no avenue of expression open. See Stone, supra
note 33, at 198-99.
HeinOnline -- 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1730 1995
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The Supreme Court has consistently applied the strictest scrutiny even to
35
viewpoint-based regulations of a limited nature.
Second, the regulations did not merely silence one viewpoint; they
also compelled Title X projects to give pregnant women information
about childbirth and prenatal care.3 6 The Court's usual antipathy to
viewpoint-based regulations is grounded in a fear of illicit government
motivation-that is, a fear that government is restricting speech because
it disapproves of a specific message.3 7 The regulations' attempt to control all aspects of what was said in Title X projects regarding abortion
made obvious the government's illicit motive.38 Indeed, the Bush administration made clear from the outset that the regulations "exhibit[ed] a
35. See, e.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970) (striking down a federal
statute prohibiting the use of military uniforms in theatrical productions tending to
discredit the armed forces); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th
Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (striking down Indianapolis antipornography ordinance).
The Court's hostility towards modest viewpoint regulations extends beyond direct
regulation of speech. The Court's decisions regarding speech on public property are a
good example. The government has broad discretion to regulate speech in "non-public
fora"-government property that is not traditionally open to speech-such as prisons,
fairgrounds, and mailboxes. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983). In fact, depending upon the nature of the non-public forum, the
government may even ban speech entirely or restrict discussion in the forum to certain
subject matter and speakers. See id. at 48-49, 53. Even given the government's wide
latitude in defining the forum and the fact that citizens remain free to speak elsewhere, the
government is still prohibited from engaging in viewpoint discrimination in non-public
fora. See Peny, 460 U.S. at 46; see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 (1993) (school district's denial of church group's
request to show religious-oriented film on school property struck down as viewpoint-based
discrimination).
In fact, the Court's application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to speech
cases reflects its hostility to modest viewpoint bias. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 519 (1958) ("denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech... is 'frankly
aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas' ") (citing American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)).
36. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b) (1994) (suspended by President Clinton Feb. 5, 1993);
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536
(1980) ("[Wihen regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental action must
be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited
'merely because public officials disapprove of the speaker's views.' "); see also Stone, supra
note 33, at 227; supra note 121.
38. The Bush administration attempted to cast the regulations as the government's
expression of a viewpoint, rather than an attempt to manipulate the viewpoint of others.
See Ruth Marcus, Abortion-Advice Ban Upheld for Federally Funded Clinics, Wash. Post,
May 24, 1991, at Al, A18. Had the regulations merely required the provision of certain
information about prenatal care and not attempted to suppress abortion information, the
government's argument that there was no attempt to manipulate viewpoint would have
been stronger. That the regulations dearly mandated childbirth information while
simultaneously suppressing information about abortion made the government's illicit
motive particularly obvious. Cf. Mark G.Yudof, When Government Speaks 234-35 (1983)
(noting that while the government arguably can add its voice to debate over public
HeinOnline -- 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1731 1995
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bias in favor of childbirth and against abortion" and that they were
designed to send the message that "the federal government does not
sanction abortion."3 9 As one scholar noted, "[I]t would be difficult to
imagine a law more clearly aimed at suppressing a dangerous idea than
40
the Title X regulations."
In light of the regulations' obvious bias, Rust did not involve as
straightforward an application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as the Court would have had us believe. Nor did the Court somehow alter the parameters of the doctrine to allow viewpoint discrimination, as some scholars contend. 4 ' The Court did not explicitly endorse
viewpoint discrimination; rather, it took pains to make its decision appear
consistent with the doctrine as traditionally understood-including the
anti-viewpoint discrimination principle espoused in so many of its previous decisions.42 Similarly, one cannot attribute the Rust decision solely to
43
the Court's often confused unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence.
matters, it cannot aim to suppress viewpoints with the use of discriminatory funding

mechanisms).
39. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2943-44 (1988). Then-Solicitor General Kenneth Starr's
comments after the Rust decision illustrate the regulation's anti-abortion agenda. Starr
said that
the administration was "pleased" that the court had ruled that "the government as
financier, as creator of government programs, should be able to make policy
determinations and specifically here it should be able to say, 'We do not want
abortion to play a role in family planning programs that are federally subsidized.'
...The government is able to take sides; it is able to have viewpoints when it is
funding."
Marcus, supra note 38, at A18.
40. Cole, supra note 8, at 688 n.47.
41. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 10, at 210 (Rust Court "endorsed the proposition that
government may, to promote its viewpoint, censor speech of publicly funded speakers");
Weeks, supra note 8, at 1668 (Rust implies that government has "almost unreviewable
authority to control the content of protected speech through federal funding").
42. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-95 (1991). Moreover, the Court recently
reaffirmed its antipathy to viewpoint-based distinctions in funding decisions. See
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2517-19 (1995). In
a 5-4 decision the Rosenberger Court ruled that the university's attempt to exclude religious
groups from certain funding allocations was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
See id. The Rasenbergermajority attempted to distinguish Rust by claiming that, in contrast
to Rosenbergerwhich involved government efforts to "create a program to encourage private
speech," Rust involved government attempts to "enlist[ ] private entities to convey its own
message." Id. at 2518-19. Although viewpoint discrimination was impermissible in the
former, it was permissible in the latter. At best, such a distinction seems naive given its
assumption "that private and state speech always may be separated by clean lines and that
[Rosenberger] involve[d] only the former" while Rust involved the latter. Id. at 2548 n.11
(Souter,J., dissenting). This is especially true when one considers that many of the Title X
recipients in Rust clearly did not view themselves as government employees enlisted to
convey a particular message. At worst, such a distinction encourages the government to
manipulate its characterization of certain programs in order to control what is said.
43. See, e.g., MichaelJ. Elston, Artists and Unconstitutional Conditions: The Big Bad
Wolf Won't Subsidize Little Red Riding Hood's Indecent Art, Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Autumn 1993, at 327, 340-43 (noting the Court's often confused application of the
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With respect to selective government funding aimed at suppressing particular viewpoints, the Court has been consistent. It has never wavered
from the proposition that the government cannot use funding decisions
to suppress viewpoints with which it disagrees4" and, in cases involving
actual viewpoint discrimination, it has explicitly acknowledged the regulations' unconstitutionality. 45 Rather, the key to the Rust Court's treatment
of the regulations lies in its inability to see abortion counseling as speech.
The Rust majority's conflation of speech and conduct is obvious at
several points in its opinion, beginning with the Court's discussion of the
parameters of Title X itself. According to the Court, Title X was designed
to subsidize preconception family planning services.4 6 As such, the ban
on abortion counseling (a post-conception activity) was no different from
a ban on the provision of prenatal care by a doctor (another post-conception activity). Both were "prohibition[s] on a project grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside of the project's scope." 4 7 In
rejecting the Rust petitioners' argument that the regulations were viewpoint-discriminatory, the Court stated that the government can "selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in
the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program."48 Such an action is not viewpoint discrimination; it is merely a
government decision "to fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other."4 9 Finally, in distinguishing one of the numerous precedents cited
by petitioners, the majority commented that the regulations were not a
"case of a general law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of
speech content, but a case of the Government refusing to fund activities,
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its potential effect on Rust); Nancy Pineles, Note,
Rust on the Constitution: Politics and Gag Rules, 37 How. L.J. 83, 98-101 (1998) (noting
that the Court's inability to distinguish between its "coercion" and "free choice"
approaches in subsidy cases may have resulted in Rust).

44. See supra note 23 and cases cited therein.
45. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (requiring veterans to
sign loyalty oaths to qualify for tax benefits violates First and Fourteenth Amendments); see
also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (finding unconstitutional public school
teacher's dismissal for publicly criticizing school administration). In fact, at least twice the
Court has intimated that mere subject matter based discrimination in funding/taxing
decisions is impermissible. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
229-31 (1987); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1984). One could
argue that these cases are anomalous in their strict scrutiny of subsidies based on subject
matter distinctions; however, the Court's expanded protection of speech in those cases
certainly supports the proposition that, even in the subsidies context, the Court looks
askance at attempts to suppress particular points of view.
46. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
47. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
49. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. ("'A refusal to fund protected activy, without
more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity.'") (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); id. (" 'There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity

consonant with legislative policy.'") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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includingspeech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded."50 Indeed, with the exception of the last statement, the
Court never referred to abortion counseling as speech, and even then it
was subsumed into the "activity" of "family planning/abortion."
Once the Rust Court transformed speech into action, its decision became easy to justify. With the Rust regulations framed as restrictions on
"activity," the case before the Court became indistinguishable from previous cases in which the Court refused to require subsidization of abortions
or other activities, leaving the decision to subsidize within the legislature's discretion. 51 More importantly, by defining abortion counseling as
an activity, the Court was not compelled to apply traditional speech jurisprudence to the regulations at issue, including its usual strict review of
viewpoint-based regulations.
Significantly, Rust is not the only instance in which the Supreme
Court treated abortion counseling as an activity rather than as speech.
Only a year later in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,52 the Supreme Court
again overlooked the significant speech implications of Pennsylvania's
abortion statute and upheld it as a reasonable regulation of the medical
profession.
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
The Casey petitioners challenged several provisions of Pennsylvania's
abortion statute, 55 primarily claiming that they violated a woman's Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy.54 However, petitioners also challenged one provision, the informed consent requirement, 55 as a violation
of the First Amendment's protection of speech. 5 6 As in Rust, the Court
50. Id. at 194-95 (distinguishing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.

221 (1987)) (emphasis added).
51. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-77 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
311-27 (1980). A few commentators have noted the Rust Court's reliance on Maher and
Harris in its elision of the distinction between speech and conduct. See, e.g., Cooper,
supra note 8, at 380-81 (Rust Court's treatment of abortion counseling as activity rather
than speech violates fundamental precepts regarding the First Amendment and the free
flow of information); Mayo, supra note 8, at 313-14 (criticizing Rust Court's reliance on
abortion funding cases to reach a similar decision when speech issues are involved);
Rohde, supra note 8, at 159 (arguing that Rust Court manipulated past unconstitutional
conditions precedent and facts in its effort to uphold regulations).
52. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
53. The provisions at issue in Casey included a 24-hour waiting period requirement,
an informed consent provision, a parental consent provision, a spousal notification
provision, and various reporting and recordkeeping requirements. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. §§ 3205, 3206, 3207(b), 3209, 3214(a), 3214(f) (1983 & Supp. 1995).
54. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803, 2820-33; see also infra Part lIA.2. for a more
detailed discussion of the Court's decision regarding petitioners' Fourteenth Amendment
claims.
55. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3205 (Supp. 1995).
56. See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 53-55, Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(Nos. 91-744 and 91-902).
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ignored the speech aspects of the informed consent provision and found
it constitutional.
Section 3205, the informed consent provision of Pennsylvania's
amended abortion statute, requires doctors to provide women seeking
abortions with certain information, including the risks of and alternatives
to the procedure, the medical risks of carrying the child to term, and the
probable gestational age of the "unborn child" at the time of the abortion. 5 7 The statute further requires physicians to inform their patients of
the availability of (1) printed materials published by the state describing
the fetus and providing information about alternatives to abortion,5 8 (2)
medical assistance benefits for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal
care,5 9 and (3) information pertaining to the father's legal responsibility
to assist with child support.60 All information must be provided at least
24 hours prior to an abortion 61 and the woman must certify in writing
that she has received it. 62 Any physician failing to comply with this statute
is subject to suspension or revocation of her license for "unprofessional
63
conduct" in addition to criminal penalties.
The health care providers who were the petitioners in Casey challenged Section 3205 as violating the First Amendment by compelling
them to act as mouthpieces for the state in discouraging abortion. 64 Specifically, petitioners relied on Wooley v. Maynard65 and a series of cases
which held that the state may not "constitutionally require an individual
57. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3205(a)(1) (Supp. 1995).
58. See id. § 3205(a) (2). Section 3208 contains an extensive description of the
content of the printed materials to be made available. For example, the materials must
include a geographical index and description of all available programs designed to assist a
woman through pregnancy and adoption as well as information on the availability of
medical assistance benefits for pregnancy and neonatal care. See id. § 3208(a) (1).
Furthermore, the materials must contain a statement that the father is liable for child
support payments even if he has offered to pay for the abortion and a statement that
adoptive parents can legally pay the costs of pregnancy, childbirth, and neonatal care. See
id. They additionally must contain "accurate scientific" descriptions of the probable
anatomical and physiological characteristics of the fetus at two-week gestational increments
from fertilization to full term (including pictures), as well as relevant information on the
possibility of the fetns's survival. See id. § 3208 (a) (2).
59. See id. § 3205(a) (2).
60. See id.
61. See id. §§ 3205(a) (1), (a)(2).

62. See id. § 3205(a) (4).
63. See id. § 3205(c). Section 3205(c) provides that any physician who performs an
abortion without obtaining certification is guilty of a "summary offense" for the first failure
and a "misdemeanor of the third degree" for each subsequent failure. The district court in

Casey found "no other instance [in which] an informed consent regulation provide[s] for
criminal penalties." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1355 (E.D. Pa.
1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
64. See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 53-55, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902).
65. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message." 66 Petitioners contended that the state's anti-abortion message was obvious throughout Section 3205, although that provision purported to require only the
provision of neutral information.6 7 They relied heavily on the fact that
Section 3205 required provision of specific, detailed information about
abortion alternatives to every patient, regardless of individual circumstances and under duress of criminal penalties. 68 Such requirements
forced physicians "'to act in a manner inconsistent with their professional judgment'" and forced them to "convey the state's message at the
their own conscientious beliefs and professional
cost of violating
69
commitments."
Respondents, also recognizing the speech implications of Section
3205, grounded their defense of the statute in First Amendment principles as well, arguing that the statute was a permissible regulation of commercial speech. 70 Relying on the Third Circuit's ruling below, 7 1 respondents argued that commercial speech enjoys less protection than other
66. Id. at 713. Wooley, which held that the state cannot punish citizens for obscuring a
"Live Free or Die" motto on license plates, is but one of many cases recognizing that the
government cannot compel one to foster an ideology. Thus, the government cannot
require students to say the pledge of allegiance in school, see West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), newspapers to run editorial replies of political
candidates whom they have criticized, see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 258 (1974), privately owned utilities to enclose in its billing envelopes inserts
from advocacy groups who disagree with the utilities' views, see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1986), or parties to agency shop agreements to
pay dues used to advance political objectives, see Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 232-37 (1977).
Significantly, the Court's antipathy toward government-compelled speech extends to
compelled disclosure of fact as well as statements of ideology. Thus, the Court in Riley v.
National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), struck down a North Carolina statute
that required professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the average
percentage of the amount raised that was actually turned over to the charitable
organizations for which they were working. That the statute involved merely "compelled
statements of 'fact' "as opposed to compelled statements of opinion made no difference to
the Court since "either form of compulsion burden[ed] protected speech." Id. at 797-98.
67. See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 54-55, Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791.
The district court in Casey similarly noted that "[t]he mandated information required by
sections 3205 and 3208 will create the impression in women that the Commonwealth
disapproves of the woman's decision" and that itwas "an attempt by the Commonwealth to
alter a woman's decision after she has determined that an abortion is in her best interest."
Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1354.
68. See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 54-55, Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791.
69. Id. (quoting Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1354).
70. See Brief for Respondents at 70-71, Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The Supreme Court
has defined commercial speech as "speech which does 'no more than propose a
commercial transaction.'" Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
71. The Third Circuit, in contrast to the district court, upheld Section 3205 as a
permissible regulation of commercial speech. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d
682, 705 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
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forms of speech, especially when, as here, the government regulation
compels disclosure of factual information rather than suppresses
information. 72
Despite briefing of the free speech issues by both sides, the Casey
joint opinion 73 dismissed petitioners' First Amendment argument in a
few short sentences:
To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak
are implicated, [see Wooley v. Maynard,] but only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated
by the State here. 74
Other than a brief citation to Wooley, the joint opinion did not discuss the
parameters of the petitioners' compelled speech argument.75 Nor did it
pick up on respondents' commercial speech argument-an especially
surprising omission in light of the Third Circuit's discussion of the issue.
The joint opinion's failure to discuss the First Amendment implications of Section 3205 is telling, although not because the Justices were
necessarily wrong in refusing to find a violation of the First Amendment.
Indeed, resolution of this particular speech issue would have been difficult and, arguably, an issue of first impression for the Court. 76 The issue
before the Court-whether the state could compel physicians to give certain factual, abortion-related information to clients-did not fall squarely
72. See Brief for Respondents at 70-71, Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791. Respondents and the
Third Circuit relied primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, which held that states may require attorneys to disclose certain
information regarding contingent fee arrangements in advertisements as long as the
"disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing
deception of consumers." 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
73. Although a majority of the Court voted to uphold Section 3205, the Justices were
badly split as to their reasoning. Only the joint opinion discussed the First Amendment
aspects of the informed consent provision. The remaining fourJustices voting to uphold it
simply relied on a due process argument-that abortion procedures, including the
informed consent provision, were subject to reasonable regulation by the legislature. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2867 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also infra Part 1I.A2. for a discussion of
the various opinions in Casey.
74. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)) (other
citations omitted).
75. Petitioners also briefly raised a second First Amendment argument regarding
Section 3205. They argued that the statute
violat[ed] the FirstAmendment rights of the woman who must listen to the state's
litany in order to obtain an abortion. 'While [the government] clearly has a right
to express [its] views to those who wish to listen, [it] has no right to force [its]
message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it.'
Brief for Petitioners at 54 n.86, Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (quoting Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (DouglasJ., concurring)). Neither respondents nor the
Court responded to this argument.
76. For a suggested First Amendment analysis of medical counseling, including
abortion counseling, see generally Berg, supra note 10, at 243-65.
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within the precedents cited by either petitioners or respondents. On the
one hand, the factual information compelled by Section 3205 is not necessarily "ideological" in the same sense as the political message compelled
in Wooley. 7 7 On the other hand, counseling about abortion does not fall
within the Supreme Court's definition of commercial speech-that
which proposes a commercial transaction. 78 Moreover, although the
Court has allowed the government more leeway to compel disclosure of
factual information in the commercial speech context, such compulsion
79
still may be prohibited if it attempts to prescribe an ideology.

The joint opinion's real flaw came in its cavalier dismissal of petitioners' free speech argument because it did not consider abortion counseling to be a form of speech. In fact, the opinion gives one the impression
that abortion counseling is so obviously a form of activity rather than
speech that it is not even worth discussing at length. According to the
joint opinion, abortion counseling is merely "part of the practice of
medicine," and thus an activity easily regulated by the state.8 0 The
Court's justification for its decision to uphold Section 3205 in the face of
petitioners' First Amendment challenge included specific references to
previous decisions giving legislatures broad discretion to regulate business and professional activity, rather than citations to free speech prece77. It is not unusual for states to have statutes, as did Pennsylvania, requiring that
persons undergoing medical treatment receive certain information about the risks of
surgery, potential side effects of certain drugs, etc. See, e.g., 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 1301.103 (1992) (requiring that physician inform a patient of the "nature of the
proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks and alternatives to treatment or
diagnosis that a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision whether or not
to undergo treatment or diagnosis" prior to provision of health care services). Such
informed consent provisions are largely uncontroversial. Much of the material in Sections
3205 and 3208, however, went well beyond giving patients an assessment of medical risks
and, in addition, focused on social, cultural, and economic issues related to abortion. See
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3205 (a) (2) (Supp. 1995) (requiring physician to inform patient
of abortion alternatives, right to medical assistance benefits for childbirth-related activities,
and right to child support from the father of the unborn child); id. § 3208 (requiring
Department of Health to make available pamphlets describing development of the unborn
child at two week intervals). Thus, Sections 3205 and 3208 were at least a hybrid of
ideological and factual information. See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological
Association In Support of Petitioners at 19, Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (arguing that "[i]n the
guise of obtaining 'informed consent,' the Pennsylvania Act thrusts health care
professionals into the woman's broader decisionmaking process").
78. See Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976). For a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between
abortion counseling and commercial speech, see infra notes 135-188 and accompanying
text

79. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); see also
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 2347 (1995)
(state may only" 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising' by requiring
the dissemination of 'purely factual and uncontroversial information'") (quoting
Zauderer).
80. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2824.
HeinOnline -- 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1738 1995

19951

ABORTION COUNSELING AS VCE ACTIVITY

1739

dents.8 1 That the joint opinion lumped together all of the challenged
statutory provisions, referring to them as "health regulations" involving
"medical procedure [s],"82 further evidences its confusion of speech and
conduct. There was no recognition that one of those medical procedures
83
primarily involved speech.
Casey, decided a year after Rust and in a different jurisprudential
context, makes obvious the conflation of speech and conduct and thus
reveals it to be the thread unifying the decisions. The Rust Court's discussion was littered with unconstitutional conditions analysis, making that

conflation difficult to identify. The Casey Court never really bothered to
consider the First Amendment implications of the statute, and instead
flatly stated that abortion counseling could be regulated as a medical activity. An examination of the speech/conduct distinction in Supreme
Court jurisprudence, however, does not support the Court's characterization of abortion counseling as conduct.
C. Rust, Casey, and the Speech/Conduct Distinction in First Amendment

Jurisprudence
The Court's treatment of abortion counseling as conduct in Rust and
Casey presents a twofold problem. First, abortion counseling is a form of
speech under the Court's longstandingjurisprudence. Second, although
the Court has held that speech can occasionally amount to conduct for
81. See id. (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (holding that statute
requiring filing of certain information regarding potentially harmful drugs with the New
York State Health Department was a reasonable exercise of state police powers) and
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486-91 (1955) (holding various
regulations pertaining to optometry profession to be consistent with the Due Process and
Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment)).
82. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2821.
83. Medical activity that consists primarily of speech does not automatically deserve
First Amendment protection. There are instances when speech essentially amounts to the
practice of medicine and could be considered a regulated activity. For example, physician
advice regarding the necessity or wisdom of a particular surgical procedure could give rise
to malpractice liability, which many would agree has few First Amendment implications
even though the advice is itself speech. See, e.g., Robert Post, Recuperating First
Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1254 (1995) (noting that the bare fact of
communication does not necessarily implicate the First Amendment). This proposition
may be true when the regulation at issue is general in application, such as common law
and statutory malpractice laws which aim at a generally defined activity. However, when
the government targets speech for regulation, as Pennsylvania did with Section 3205, one
simply cannot ignore the potential First Amendment considerations-primarily because
once the government seeks out speech for regulation, one must be concerned with
attempts to manipulate information. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and
Distrust, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1171, 1173 (1993) (arguing that much of the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence is propelled by a distrust of government efforts to alter the
distribution of information). This is not to say that speech always deserves First
Amendment protection; indeed, there are many instances when it does not. See infra Part
I.0. However, regulations targeting speech ought to at least raise a First Amendment issue
for the Court.
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First Amendment purposes, it has done so only in narrowly defined circumstances inapplicable to abortion counseling.
The speech/conduct distinction, a recurring one in First Amendmentjurisprudence, is grounded in the idea that, while the First Amend84
ment protects freedom of expression, it does not protect mere action.
The distinction is most important in those situations where the Court
must determine whether certain nonverbal conduct, such as flag burning8 5 or boycotts, 8 6 is "expressive." Under Supreme Court jurisprudence,
expressive conduct enjoys First Amendment protection,8 7 although not
always to the same extent as "pure speech."8 8 Nonexpressive conduct enjoys no First Amendment protection.8 9
84. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199 (1993) (First Amendment
does not protect violence); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982)
(distinguishing between conduct intended to express an idea and that which produces
harm distinct from communicative impact). Professor Emerson framed the issue as
follows:
The first task is to formulate in detail the distinction between "expression" and
"action.".. . [T]he whole theory and practice of freedom of expression-the
realization of any of the values it attempts to secure-rests upon this distinction.
Hence the starting point for any legal doctrine must be to fix this line of
demarcation.
Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 60 (1966)
(hereinafter General Theory). Numerous scholars have questioned the wisdom of
distinguishing between speech and conduct, especially given Professor Emerson's
admission that the line between speech and action "at many points ... becomes obscure.
Expression often takes place in a context of action, or is closely linked with it, or is
equivalent in its impact." Id. For a sampling of the numerous articles debating the
speech/conduct distinction in First Amendment jurisprudence, see John Hart Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1494 (1975); Thomas I. Emerson, First
Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 422, 430 (1980); Kent
Greenawalt, O'er the Land of the Free: Flag Burning as Speech, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 925, 928
(1990).
Despite the rigorous debate among scholars, the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Mitchell reaffirmed the vitality of the speech/conduct distinction in First Amendment
jurisprudence. See Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201 (upholding Wisconsin's use of penalty
enhancements in bias and hate crimes because penalties were "aimed at conduct
unprotected by the First Amendment").
85. See Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989).
86. See Claiborne Hardware,458 U.S. at 907; International Longshoremen's Ass'n v.
Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 214 (1982).
87. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405-06 (holding that flag burning is expressive
conduct under the First Amendment); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)
(acknowledging that draft card burning might have sufficient expressive elements to bring
it within the purview of the First Amendment).
88. See OTrien, 391 U.S. at 377 (holding that regulation of expressive conduct does
not violate the First Amendment if it is within the constitutional power of the government,
it furthers an important or substantial government interest, the government interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the incidental restriction of First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential to further the government interest).
89. See supra note 84 and cases cited therein. At least one commentator has noted
that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court has recognized that some conduct may not be
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Insofar as abortion counseling is concerned, however, the issue is not
whether it is expressive or nonexpressive conduct, but whether it is conduct at all. In the Rust Court's own words, the regulations prohibited
"counseling, referral, and... provision of information regarding abortion as a method of family planning." 90 Similarly, the Pennsylvania informed consent statute in Casey directed doctors to "orally inform" women of certain information pertaining to abortion procedures and
alternatives. 9 1 It seems apparent that the counseling provisions in Rust
and Casey involve speech or expression in its most literal sense-that is,
they involve oral or written communication of information. 92 More importantly, they involve speech in the sense used by the Supreme Court in
its First Amendment decisions: the direct communication of ideas. 93 To
protected as symbolic speech by the First Amendment, it has rarely, except in dicta,
encountered such conduct." The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 Harv.
L. Rev. 144, 239-40 (1993) (citations omitted). The Court's decision in Mitchell, however,
may signal an increased willingness to find certain conduct nonexpressive and, therefore,
unprotected.
90. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). The wording of the regulations is
almost identical to the Supreme Court's description. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a) (1)
(1994) (suspended by President Clinton Feb. 3, 1993) ("A title X project may not provide
counseling concerning the use of abortion... or provide referral for abortion .... ."); id.
§ 59.8(a) (2) (Tide X patient must be "provided with information necessary to protect the
health of mother and unborn child").
91. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3205(a) (1)-(2) (1983 & Supp. 1995) (noting that
the physician shall "inform[ ]" or "orally inform[ ]" patients of certain information).
92. Webster's dictionary defines the term "speech" as "the communication or
expression of thoughts in spoken words." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1129
(10th ed. 1994). It further defines the term "express" as "to make known ... opinions or
feelings." Id. at 410. "Act," on the other hand is defined as "the doing of a thing." Id. at
11. While speech and expression also involve "the doing of a thing," they are specifically
limited in that they contemplate an act of communication. This narrowing focus
distinguishes between speech/expression and action. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official
English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 1994), reh'g granted, 53 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1995)
(noting that speech "consists of the 'expressive conduct' of vibrating one's vocal chords,
moving one's mouth ... or of putting pen to paper, or hand to keyboard"). With these
distinctions in mind, the definitions of the "activities" such as advocacy, counseling, and
referral prohibited by the Rust regulations clearly fall within the narrow purview of speech
or expression and, therefore, should be treated as such. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary, supra, at 18 (defining the verb "advocate" as "to plead in favor of"); id. at 264
(defining the verb "counsel" as to "advise"); id. at 982 (defining the verb "refer" as "to
direct attention usu[ally] by clear and specific mention").
93. The Court has sought to protect the communication of ideas in order to protect
other fundamental values. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-73
(1964) ("central meaning of the First Amendment" is to protect speech that enables
citizens to make decisions regarding self-governance); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (listing various values protected by the First
Amendment). Professor Emerson has grouped these values into four broad categories:
Maintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as a method of
assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a
method of securing participation by the members of the society in social,
including political, decisionmaking, and (4) as a means of maintaining the
balance between stability and change in the society.
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treat the Rust and Casey counseling provisions as something other than
regulations of speech is simply absurd. Unlike the burning of a flag or
draft card, which only becomes expressive in certain contexts, there is no
reason to counsel other than to provide or communicate information.
With expression as its very essence, how can abortion counseling not be
considered speech? At the very least, abortion counseling includes an
expressive component that should have triggered First Amendment scru94
tiny in Rust and Casey.
There is a flip side to the jurisprudential distinction between speech
and conduct. Just as one can say that some conduct amounts to speech
or expression, one can say that some speech or expression occasionally
amounts to conduct. For example, the Court has previously deemed
"fighting words" and "obscenity" to be so far removed from the "essential
part of any exposition of ideas"95 that they enjoy no First Amendment
protection.9 6 The Court has reasoned that fighting words such as epithets and other forms of personal abuse are more akin to physical assaults

Emerson, General Theory, supra note 84, at 3. Abortion counseling fulfills at least one, if
not all, of these values. For example, the ability to terminate a pregnancy often has a
significant effect on a woman's ability to take control of her life. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375,
382-86 (1985); Gatherine A MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale
LJ. 1281, 1309-28 (1991). Thus, abortion counseling fosters a woman's personal
autonomy and individual self-fulfillment. See also Berg, supra note 10, at 236-39 (arguing
that "[d]octor-patient speech is essential to maintaining patients' autonomy, selfdetermination, and dignity in the face of illness"). Professor Berg posits an additional way
in which doctor-patient speech serves the values underlying the First Amendment. Doctorpatient discourse facilitates the patient's discovery of her "medical truth"-"the particular
course of treatment that is best for [her]." Id. at 235-36. Additionally, such discourse also
facilitates "the discovery of scientific and medical truth" because "conversations with
numerous patients over time enhance doctors' scientific and medical knowledge about...
the practice of medicine." Id. at 236.
94. Several Supreme Court decisions suggest that even regulation of conduct is
impermissible under the First Amendment if it is aimed at suppressing expression. See
Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (government "may not... proscribe particular
conduct because it has expressive elements"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (implying that state regulation of conduct aimed at suppressing free expression is
impermissible). As discussed in Part I, supra, the apparent purpose and effect of the
counseling provisions in Rust and Casy was to skew the information provided about
abortion; the provisions were, therefore, aimed at expression rather than conduct.
95. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
96. Originally, the Supreme Court also found libel and commercial speech to be
completely unprotected by the FirstAmendment. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
256-57 (1952) ("libelous... utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas");
Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (noting that the First Amendment poses
"no... restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising"). Currently,
however, the Court accords both categories of speech some protection, although less than
it accords purely "political" speech. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-62 (1976) (advertising); New York Times, 376
U.S. at 269 (libel).
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than to speech. 9 7 The Court has similarly held that obscenity is so far
removed from the exposition of ideas that it "is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press." 98 Abortion counseling simply
does not fall within the fighting words doctrine; 99 nor can one say that
abortion counseling amounts to "lewd and obscene" speech.1 0 0 More importantly, one cannot say that such counseling is not an "essential part of
the exposition of ideas" given that the whole point of abortion counseling
is to advise and communicate information to women so that they may
make life-affecting decisions.
Additionally, even if abortion counseling were conduct-like, and thus
outside the purview of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court recently
indicated that viewpoint-based discrimination is still impermissible. That
is, although the government can proscribe entire categories of speech,
such as fighting words, it must nevertheless neutrally regulate such
speech and cannot ban one viewpoint while leaving others unregulated.10 1 Thus, even if counseling were akin to conduct, the Court should
02
have scrutinized the provisions for viewpoint discrimination.'
It appears, then, that the Court's traditional conduct-as-speech and
speech-as-conduct analyses do not support an argument that abortion
counseling amounts to conduct. And, in fact, those analyses appear nowhere in the Rust and Casey decisions. Rather, the Court simply asserted
that the speech at issue was a regulated activity by subsuming the speech
aspects of abortion counseling into a separate activity- the act of abortion.' 0 3 Because the Court viewed abortion counseling as integral to the
act of abortion, it could not (nor did not) distinguish between the two.
97. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
309-10 (1940)); see also David S. Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the
Guarantee of Freedom of Speech, 35 Md. L. Rev. 555, 558 (1976) (noting that fighting
words are "similar in nature to a physical attack").
98. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
99. Fighting words are those "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and
thereby cause a breach of the peace." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
100. The Supreme Court has most recently defined "obscenity" as a work which (1)
"'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find .... taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest," (2) depicts "in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct," and (3) "taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citation omitted).
101. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct 2538, 2545-47 (1992) (holding that
statute banning only racially hateful fighting words was impermissible viewpoint-based
discrimination even though fighting words as a whole were proscribable).
102. For an interesting comparison of the Court's treatment of viewpoint
discrimination in Rust and R.A.V., see Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First
Amendment Neutrality:. R.A.V. v. St. Pau4 Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of ContentBased Underinclusion, 1992 Sup. Ct. Rev. 29, 38.
103. One could argue that the Court subsumed abortion counseling into a broader
activity, the practice of medicine, rather than the narrower activity of abortion. However,
as discussed in Part Im, infra, the special nature of abortion was a driving force for the Rust
and Casey Courts' treatment of abortion counseling, thus, abortion appears to be the more
appropriate activity on which to focus.
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Such an approach does not comport with the First Amendment doctrine
currently applied by the Court. While the Court has considered some
speech to be conduct and vice versa, no established doctrine denies First
merely because speech is associated with another
Amendment protection
10 4
regulated activity.
II. ABORION COUNSELING As ECONOMIC AcTIvriY

There is one notable exception to the Court's refusal to subsume
speech into related economic activity. In Posadasde Puerto Rico Associates
v. Tourism Company, 10 5 the Court briefly deviated from its usual commercial speech jurisprudence and ruled that such speech could be regulated
as part of the state regulation of economic activity. That reasoning appears to have resurfaced in the Court's Rust and Casey opinions.
A. Commercial Speech, Posadas, and the "GreaterIncludes Lesser" Rationale
Since the Court's 1976 decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., commercial speech-defined as
6
that which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction"' -10 7
has enjoyed at least a measure of First Amendment protection.
104. Some scholars have argued forcefully that commercial speech is
indistinguishable from other commercial activities. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & John
C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65
Va. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1979) ("The decisive point [in determining whether the First
Amendment should apply] is the absence of any principled distinction between
commercial soliciting and other aspects of economic activity."). Nevertheless, the Court
has held that such speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection. See Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (although "advertiser's interest is a purely economic one . . . [t]hat hardly
disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment").
105. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
106. Vnginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
107. See id. at 763-64. Some commentators argue that recent decisions have gutted
the holding in Vaginia State Board and a related case, Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See, e.g., Albert P. Mauro, Jr., Comment,
Commercial Speech After Posadasand Fox- A Rational Basis Wolf in Intermediate Sheep's
Clothing, 66 Tul. L Rev. 1931, 1931 (1992) (arguing that the Court's recent
interpretations of Central Hudson have "rendered [commercial speech] an endangered
species"); David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 Cal.
L Rev. 359, 369-81 (1990) (noting evolution of commercial speech cases and weakened
protection for such speech). In many cases since Vrginia State Board and Central Hudson
the Court has indeed upheld regulations of commercial speech. Nevertheless, it is a
mistake to say that such speech enjoys almost no protection, especially since the Court
recently used CentralHudson to strike down regulations of commercial speech in at least
two cases. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1804 (1993) (affirming lower court
decision to strike down Florida rule prohibiting in-person solicitation by accountants); City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1517 (1993) (affirming lower
court decision to strike down city ordinance prohibiting distribution of commercial
handbills on public property).
HeinOnline -- 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1744 1995

1995]

ABORTION COUNSELING AS VWCE ACTIVITY

1745

Although the Court recognized that advertisers' interests were primarily
economic, it nevertheless extended First Amendment protection to commercial speech because of society's strong interest in the "free flow of
commercial information"-even information as seemingly mundane as
drug prices. 10 8 Recognizing, however, that "the Constitution... accords
a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression," 10 9 the Court has applied less rigorous scrutiny to
regulations of commercial speech-upholding regulations of commercial
speech about lawful activities as long as they serve a substantial government interest, directly advance that interest, and are no broader than
necessary to protect that interest." 0 In 1986, however, the Court handed
down an aberrant 5-4 decision in Posadas.
Posadas addressed a Puerto Rico statute legalizing casino gambling
but outlawing advertisement of that gambling to Puerto Rico residents."'
Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, admitted that the advertising at issue involved a lawful activity and thus was governed by Virginia
State Board and its progeny; Puerto Rico could justify its restriction on
casino advertising only by showing that the regulation directly advanced a
substantial government interest and was no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 1 2 Puerto Rico's asserted interest in banning
advertising of gambling was its desire to decrease the demand for gambling by reducing citizens' awareness that it existed." 8
After Virginia State Board, one would have thought that Puerto Rico's
approach was doomed, based as it was upon squelching the free flow of
commercial information. Justice Rehnquist, however, saw no constitu108. See Vrginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 763-64. The Court noted that a consumer's
interest in drug prices could perhaps be keener than her interest in even the "most urgent
political debate," especially given that "[those whom the suppression of prescription drug
price information hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and the particularly aged." Id. at
763.
109. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
110. See Board of Trustees of S.U.N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989); Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. Fox and CentralHudson involved state attempts to regulate the
content of commercial speech. Under First Amendment jurisprudence, content-based
regulations of political or otherwise fully-protected speech are strictly scrutinized;
regulations must be narrowly drawn to meet a compelling state interest. See RA.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549 (1992); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
In contrast, the CentralHudson/Fox test requires only that the regulations be no broader
than necessary to protect a substantial state interest, giving somewhat less protection to
content-based regulations of commercial speech. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values").
111. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 332 (1986).
112. See id. at 340 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
113. See Philip B. Kurland, Posadasde PuertoRico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas Strange,
'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 9
(noting that Puerto Rico's method amounted to "[k]eep[ing] the people of Puerto Rico in
ignorance [so] .. . they will voluntarily abstain from adding their contributions to the
earnings of the wheel, the crap games, blackjack, poker, and the one-armed bandits").
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tional infirmity in Puerto Rico's statute. In his view, the legislature's concern that" '[e]xcessive casino gambling among local residents... would
produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the
Puerto Rican citizens' "114 obviously was a substantial government interest. Indeed, this same government interest had prompted the majority of
states to ban casino gambling in the first place.11 5 Thus, the only questions were whether the advertising restriction directly advanced that interest and whether it was no broader than necessary to do so. The Court
easily disposed of these issues. First, it held that Puerto Rico's statute
"directly advance[d]" its interest in protecting morality-relying mainly
on the legislature's "reasonable" belief that advertising aimed at Puerto
Rico residents would increase the demand for casino gambling." 6 Second, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the restrictions were "no more extensive than necessary" because they were aimed only at Puerto Rico citizens and not tourists.1 1 7 Thus, with only a superficial analysis of the
legislature's motives or methods," 8 the Court upheld the ban on casino
advertisements.
Had the Court's analysis ended there, one perhaps could have characterized it as an extremely deferential (and, arguably, erroneous) application of traditional commercial speech principles. In addition to traditional analysis, however, the majority opinion fashioned a new free
speech principle. Justice Rehnquist noted that although gambling was
legal in Puerto Rico, it could have been made illegal at any time. He thus
concluded that "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling
necessarily include [d] the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling."'1 9 Analogizing to laws regarding solicitation and licensing of
prostitution, Justice Rehnquist explained:
It would... surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which
would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a
product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to
forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity
of those who would profit from
through advertising on behalf
12 0
such increased demand.
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning framed commercial speech (casino advertising) as merely a subset of economic activity (gambling), which could be
regulated under traditional due process analysis as long as the legislature
114. Posadas,478 U.S. at 341 (quoting Brief for Appellees at 37).
115. See id.
116. Id. at 341-42.
117. Id. at 343.
118. See id. at 341-44; see also Kurland, supra note 113, at 7-12 (noting that, in
contrast to Vbginia State Board, the review given to the Puerto Rico legislature's finding was
extremely deferential, with the Court being "satisfied without evidence of record on the
basis of mere representations of the State").
119. Posadas,478 U.S. at 345-46.
120. Id. at 346.
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acted "reasonably." 121 Indeed, in situations involving vice activitiessuch as gambling, prostitution, smoking, and the like-the Court apparently believes the government's interest in regulating is at its highest. 122
Under the Posadasrationale, then, the state's broad discretion to regulate
almost all economic activity (especially that relating to "morals") encompasses regulation of advertising about such activities.' 23 In essence, the
Posadas Court initially recognized that casino advertising was speech, but
ultimately collapsed it into the broader activity of gambling.
The flaw in Justice Rehnquist's analysis, however, is that speech enjoys special protection under the First Amendment even when integral to
economic activity. 124 That, after all, was the rationale underlying Virginia
State Board's earlier extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech. 25 This flaw may also be the reason the Court has not cited
Posadas's"greater includes lesser" logic in subsequent free speech caseswhether they involved commercial speech 12 6 or otherwise. 12 7 Nonetheless, the Court's reasoning in Rust and Casey bears remarkable similarity
to the Posadasrationale.
121. See Kurland, supra note 113, at 14 ("By transmogrifying speech into behavior, it
becomes subject to a different-more limited-set of constitutional principles."); cf.
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (regulations of "business
and industrial conditions" are constitutionally valid as long as they are "rational").
122. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993) (noting
that gambling "implicates no constitutionally protected right; rather, it falls into a category
of 'vice' activity that could be, and frequently has been, banned altogether"); Epstein,
supra note 20, at 67.
123. Numerous scholars have criticized the Posadas Court's "greater includes lesser"
reasoning. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 20, at 66 (Posadasdecision implies that "the first
amendment protections afforded commercial speech can be no greater than the meager
protections given to economic liberties"); Kurland, supra note 113, at 13 (PosadasCourt's
rationale is a "[gross] perversion of First Amendment law"); David A. Strauss, Persuasion,
Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 334, 359-60 (1991) (Posadas
decision ignores the autonomy principle underlying the First Amendment).
124. See Posadas,478 U.S. at 354-55 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
126. The Court has cited Posadas for numerous other propositions-most of them
relating to general commercial speech doctrine. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992) (citing Posadasfor the general proposition that commercial speech
enjoys less protection than political speech); Board of Trustees of S.U.N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 474 (1989) (citing Posadasfor general commercial speech principles); San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 (1987) (citing
Posadas for the general proposition that commercial speech enjoys less protection than
political speech). As recently as 1993, the Supreme Court expressly refused to rely upon
the "greater includes lesser" argument to uphold a federal statute banning radio
broadcasts of lottery advertising by licensees located in non-lottery states. See United
States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2703 (1993) (upholding the statute as
constitutional under Central Hudson and refusing to analyze the case under the "greater
includes lesser" rationale).
127. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (Court refused to extend
"greater includes lesser" concept to regulation of the political process, where "the
importance of First Amendment protections is 'at its zenith' ").
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B. The Resurgence of the "GreaterIncludes Lesser" Reasoning in Rust and
Casey
The similarity in reasoning between Posadasand the Caseyjoint opinion is apparent, although Casey's treatment of the First Amendment issue
is quite brief. The joint opinion recognized that the informed consent
provision implicated a physician's right not to speak under the First
Amendment. However, it concluded that the provision ,was constitutional
because any effect on the physician's right to free speech came "only as a
part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State." 128 Thus, as in Posadas,the Casey joint opinion conflated a medical activity-abortion-and speech about that activityabortion counseling. The latter, as part of the former, was easily regulated by the state.
The Rust decision is similarly replete with the Posadas rationale. In
its numerous attempts to explain why the regulations did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, the Court consistently treated abortion
counseling as merely a subset of the activity of abortion. Thus, regulations banning counseling about abortion were merely "prohibition[s] on
a project grantee... from engaging in activities outside of the project's
scope."129 Similarly, the Court made clear that "when the government
appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define
the limits of that program." 13 0 In other words, just as Puerto Rico's
greater power to ban gambling included the lesser power to ban advertising of gambling, the government's power to create the Title X project
gave it the power to ban discussion by project participants of certain viewpoints about abortion.
Frankly, the appearance in Rust of the "greater includes lesser" argument is not surprising since the Court framed the issue as an unconstitutional conditions question. The "greater includes lesser" principle was
also at the core of early unconstitutional conditions cases, although it has
been abandoned in recent jurisprudence. 13 ' One could argue that the
reemergence of that principle in Rust came about mainly as a retrenching of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and had nothing to
128. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2824 (1992) (emphasis added).
The four remainingJustices voting to uphold Section 3205 did not bother to discuss the
First Amendment aspects of informed consent and instead relied on a due process
argument to uphold the regulation. See supra note 73. Perhaps even more so than the
authors of the joint opinion, these Justices could not distinguish between speech about an
activity and the activity itself.
129. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
130. Id. at 194; see also Rohde, supra note 8, at 160 (arguing that Rust may herald the
return of Posadas).
131. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 113, at 13 (noting that Posadas's reasoning
resembles an argument "long since rejected under the rubric of unconstitutional
conditions"); Sullivan, supra note 20, at 1415 (noting that current unconstitutional
conditions doctrine represents a "triumph" over earlier "greater includes lesser"
approach).
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do with Posadas. That argument, however, fails to recognize that Rust
purportedly applied current unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence,
which explicitly prohibits the government from engaging in viewpoint13 2 Of
based discrimination when doling out government benefits.
course, Rust merely paid lip-service to that tenet while allowing the government to engage in viewpoint-based suppression, an approach much
more consistent with Posadas. Under the Posadas rationale, viewpointbased suppression of speech simply was not an issue because the Court
viewed casino advertising as an activity and not as speech. By transforming advertising into activity regulated under a more lenient due process
standard, the Posadas Court was able to ignore that the advertising ban
was, in essence, viewpoint discriminatory.' 3 3 (That is, only advertisements
promoting casino gambling were banned; anti-gambling ads were not.)
The Rust Court's reasoning was similar; because abortion counseling was
merely an activity within the Title X project, it was not subject to traditional strictures of the First Amendment. Thus, as casino advertising was
to gambling, abortion counseling was to abortion. As "activities," all
could be regulated without regard to the First Amendment.
C. Posadas Does Not Apply to Abortion Counseling
The threads of Posadas's"greater includes lesser" rationale are apparent in Rust and Casey. Yet, many factors indicate that Posadas'srationale
had no place in the Casey and Rust decisions. First among these factors is
Posadas's tentative precedential value outside of the commercial speech
context. The Supreme Court has not used the "greater includes lesser"
rationale in cases that do not involve commercial speech; indeed, it has
flatly stated that such an application is improper outside of the commercial speech context.'s Thus, before one can properly apply Posadas's
182. See supra Part IA.
133. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Posadas, intimated that the advertising ban was
viewpoint discriminatory, arguing that it was a "covert attempt by the State to manipulate

the choices of its citizens... by depriving the public of the information needed to make a
free choice." Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 351 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography,
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1992) (noting that Posadasallowed the
government to ban truthful ads for casinos "even though speech that takes the opposite
side is freely permitted, in advertisements or elsewhere").
134. In striking down a Colorado law banning the use of paid petition circulators, the
Court in Meyer v. Grant refused to apply Posadas's "greater includes lesser" rationale,
stating that
Posadasis inapplicable to the present case [because] ... the speech restricted...
was merely "commercial speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction .... '" Here, by contrast, the speech at issue is "at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms," an area of public policy
where protection of robust discussion is at its zenith.
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988).
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conflation of speech and conduct to abortion counseling, one must consider such counseling to be a form of commercial speech, which it simply
is not.
While one could argue that there are commercial speech aspects to
abortion counseling-certainly, it often takes place in the context of a
commercial transaction-such counseling still does not fall within the
Court's definition of commercial speech. The Court has not held that
speech becomes commercial speech merely because it has a profit motive.' 3 5 Instead, the Court has attempted to determine whether the proposal of a commercial transaction is the "principal type of expression at
issue."'1 6 Even though abortion counseling often occurs during a commercial transaction, it does not principally involve the proposal of such a
transaction. First, the contents of the Rust regulations and Casey statute
belie any such claim: both focus on specific, substantive information to
be given to women confronting unwanted pregnancies rather than on the
commercial aspects of their transactions with the physician.' 3 7 Second,
the fact that abortion counseling can take place absent any commercial
transaction illustrates that it does not principally involve commercial activity. Finally, the Court has intimated that medical consultations for a
fee are not commercial speech because "they do not consist of speech
that proposes a commercial transaction." 13 8
Additionally, applying the Posadasrationale to abortion counseling is
difficult even if one were to consider counseling to be commercial
speech. First, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply Posadas
within the commercial speech context; no commercial speech decision
since Posadas has applied the "greater includes lesser" rationale.'3 9 Second, much of the Posadasmajority's reasoning centered around the fact
that gambling was an easily regulated-indeed bannable-activity; thus,
the government could regulate advertising of that activity as part of regulating the activity itsef. 4° Critically, the Posadas Court distinguished between advertising of such activities and advertising of constitutionally protected activities-such as abortion or contraceptive use. As the Court
explained, because the latter activities were fundamental rights under the

135. See Board of Trustees of S.U.N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); see
also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (holding that film

distributors' profit motive does not strip them of First Amendment protection).
136. Fox, 492 U.S. at 473; see also McGowan, supra note 107, at 382-90 (discussing
the Court's definition of commercial speech).
187. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1994) (suspended by President Clinton Feb. 5, 1993); 18

Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3205 (Supp. 1995).
138. Fox, 492 U.S. at 482. For a thorough discussion of the inapplicability of
commercial speech principles to abortion counseling, see Berg, supra note 10, at 239-42.
139. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.

140. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986).
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Constitution, 14 ' the government could not justi5 regulating them under
its traditional police powers. 14 If the government could not regulate an
activity under its police powers, it similarly could not use those powers to
regulate advertising about the activity. 14 3
The Court's implicit use of the Posadas"greater includes lesser" rationale to uphold the counseling provisions in Rust and Casey thus suggests a change in the status of abortion as a fundamental right. As an
analysis of the Court's recent decisions reveals, that is exactly what
happened.
III.

PLACING ABORTION COUNSELING IN THE

PsADAS FRAMEWORK

A. The Supreme Court's ChangingAbortionJurisprudence
The status of a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy has
changed dramatically over the past 25 years. Originally a criminal act in
most states,'4 its status changed almost completely when the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade'4 held abortion to be a fundamental constitutional
right. Most recently, however, the Court has retreated from its Roe holding, leaving the right to terminate a pregnancy some, but not much, constitutional protection. 146
141. See id. at 345. At the time Posadaswas decided, both abortion and contraceptive

use were considered to be fundamental constitutional rights. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 154 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965)
(contraceptive use).
142. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345. Fundamental rights-those "having a value ...
essential to individual liberty"-enjoy special protection under our Constitution. 2 Ronald
D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law Substance and Procedure
§ 15.7, at 427 (2d ed. 1992). The Court carefully scrutinizes government attempts to limit
the exercise of such rights. See id. at 427-37. In contrast, activities not deemed to be
fundamental rights may be subject to substantial government regulation, which the Court
reviews under a deferential standard. See supra note 121.
143. See Posadas,478 U.S. at 345 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977) (striking down ban on advertising or display of contraceptives) and Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-29 (1975) (striking down law prohibiting advertisements
pertaining to abortion clinics)).
144. Prior to 1973, numerous state statutes made it a crime to "procure an abortion"
unless necessary to save the life of the mother. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 &
n.2 (1973) (noting that at least 29 states had such laws).
145. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
146. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2818-21 (1992); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 516-20 (1989). A discussion of the propriety of
the Court's recent decisions curbing Roe v. Wade is beyond the scope of this article. Part Ill
of this article is meant only to examine the current status of the abortion right in order to
explain the outcome of the speech issues in Rust and Casey. I recognize, however, that
numerous scholars have argued that Roe was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
Some scholars, for example, argue that the Constitution simply does not establish a right of
privacy broad enough to justify the right to an abortion. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale LJ. 920, 931-37 (1973).
Others argue that the Roe Court engaged in political judgment rather than constitutional
"decisionmaking. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American
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1. From Roe to Casey. - In 1973, the Roe Court first held that the
right to privacy based on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause encompassed a woman's fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy. 147 Accordingly, all government attempts to regulate that right
were subject to the Court's strict scrutiny; regulations were to be "narrowly drawn" to meet a "compelling state interest."148 While the Court
deemed a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy a fundamental
right, it also held that at least two "important and legitimate" interests
existed for regulating that right: protecting the mother's health and protecting potential human life.' 4 9 Those interests, however, were not always compelling; while neither interest was sufficient to support regulations of abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy, the state's interest in
protecting the mother's health became compelling during the second trimester of pregnancy and protection of potential life became compelling
at viability (essentially at the third trimester).1 5 0 Thus, the Roe Court's
now-famous trimester framework was, in effect, merely "the Court's shortu15
hand way of expressing the result of the strict scrutiny standard.'
After Roe, the Court struck down as inconsistent with the trimester
framework numerous regulations of medical procedures related to abortions.' 52 The Court's protection of the abortion right culminated in the
mid-1980s when it expressly reaffirmed Roes validity and the fundamental
Government 118-14 (1976). Even scholars who favor the abortion right have criticized the
Roe decision. See, e.g., Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
184-94 (1989) (arguing that Roe Court's grounding of abortion right in right to privacy

was wrong and harmful to women); Ginsburg, supra note 93, at 382-86 (arguing that the
abortion right might be better grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal

Protection Clause rather than in notions of privacy).
147. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("right of privacy... is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
148.
149.
150.
151.
265, 316
152.

Id. at 155 (citations omitted).
See id. at 162.
See id. at 162-64.
Annette E. Clark, Abortion and the Pied Piper of Compromise, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
(1993).
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1983)

(invalidating requirement that all abortions after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy be
performed in a hospital as "unreasonably infring[ing] upon a woman's constitutional right
to obtain an abortion") (citing Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
439 (1983)); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976) (invalidating a
provision banning the use of saline amniocentesis after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
because it was "arbitrary" and "designed to inhibit.., the vast majority of abortions after
the first 12 weeks").
The only real exceptions to the Court's strict protection of the abortion right
appeared in decisions about government funding, see, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
474 (1977) (holding that while the government cannot place obstacles in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion, it is not required to fund such abortions) and, to some extent,
minors, see, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (upholding state statute
requiring that parents or guardians of a minor be notified, if possible, prior to performing
abortion).
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nature of the woman's right to choose an abortion. 153 Although a majority of the Court consistently reaffirmed the fundamental nature of the
abortion right in post-Roe cases, dissension among the Justices increased.
By 1986, the seven to two margin in favor of Roe54 had shrunk to five to
four' 55 and several Justices favored revisiting Roe.156 Moreover, the
Reagan Administration's appointment of two conservative (and presumably anti-Roe) Justices in the late 1980s cast Rods viability further in
15 7
doubt.
The Court's internal dissension over the abortion right resulted in
the badly splintered 1989 decision, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services.158 At issue in Webster, as in so many previous cases, was the constitutionality of several state regulations of the abortion procedure which
159
did not totally ban abortion, but imposed significant restrictions on it.
Although a majority of the Court upheld the provisions, no single opinion garnered a majority. A plurality of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
153. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 772 (1986) ("Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or
more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision ... whether to
end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is fundamental."); Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983) ("Since Roe was
decided in January 1973, the Court repeatedly and consistently has accepted and applied
the basic principle that a woman has a fundamental right to make the highly personal
choice whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
For a more thorough discussion of the decisions, background, and history of Roe and
its progeny, see Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 10-26 (1990); C.
Elaine Howard, Note, The Roe'd to Confusion: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 30 Hous. L.
Rev. 1457, 1467-75 (1993).
154. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Douglas, and Stewart and Chief

Justice Burger voted to strike down the Texas law in Roe. Justices White and Rehnquist
dissented from the majority position, arguing that a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy was beyond constitutional protection. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J.,
dissenting).
155. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens voted in the majority
to strike down the Thornburgh regulations as violations of a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759-71. justices Rehnquist and White, the original
dissenters in Roe, were joined by Chief Justice Burger, who had concurred in the Roe
outcome, andJustice O'Connor, who had been appointed to replaceJustice Stewart. See
id. at 785-814.
156. See Alan I. Bigel, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey:
Constitutional Principles and Political Turbulence, 18 U. Dayton L. Rev. 733, 738-40
(1993) (analyzing various Justices' opinions of the Roe decision).
157. President Reagan appointed Justices Scalia and Kennedy in 1986 and 1988
respectively. See Tribe, supra note 153, at 17 (discussing change in the Court's makeup
from Roe through Thornburgh); Bigel, supra note 156, at 784-39 (reviewing Supreme Court
Justices' views on abortion in the period leading up to Casey).
158. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
159. Those restrictions included a requirement that physicians perform viability
testing on any fetus believed to be at least twenty weeks old and a complete ban on the use
of public employees and facilities to perform nontherapeutic abortions. See Mo. Rev. Stat.
§§ 188.029, 188.210, 188.215 (1986).
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Justices White and Kennedy argued that Roe's "rigid trimester analysis"
should be overturned. 160 Additionally, they argued that the right to terminate a pregnancy was merely a "liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause" rather than a fundamental right.' 6 ' Thus, they would
have upheld the statutory provisions as "permissibly further[ing] the
State's interest in protecting potential human life. 1 62 Because the
Missouri statute did not criminalize all abortions, the plurality refused to
overrule Roe entirely, claiming that the issue was not precisely before the
Court.163

Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, took issue with the plurality's unwillingness to dismantle completely "the mansion of constitutionalized abortion law, constructed overnight in Roe v. Wade"16 4 and would
have expressly overruled Roe.'6 5 Justice O'Connor also voted to uphold
the challenged provisions, although her reasoning differed from the plurality's and Justice Scalia's.' 6 6 She believed the provisions were valid because they did not impose an "undue burden" on a woman's right to an
abortion. 167 The remaining four Justices-Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens-dissented from the judgment and reaffirmed their
position that the right to terminate a pregnancy was fundamental. 168 After Webster, then, the status of the abortion right was unclear at best. 169
160. Webster, 492 U.S. at 517-18.

161. Id. at 520. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's description of the abortion right as a mere
"liberty interest" is reminiscent of his dissent in Roe. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173

(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's "sweeping invalidation of any
restrictions on abortion during the first trimester [was] impossible to justify under the

[rational relation] standard, and the Roe majority's conscious weighing of competing
factors... [was] far more appropriate to a legislative judgment than ajudicial one").
162. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20.
163. See id. at 521.
164. Id. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
165. See id. at 532.
166. See id. at 522-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).

167. See id. at 530. The parameters ofJustice O'Connor's standard in Webster are not
clear. In previous opinions, she articulated that a government regulation imposed an

undue burden "in situations involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the
abortion decision, not wherever .. . [the] regulation may 'inhibit' abortions to some

degree." Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 464 (1983) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting)). Nevertheless it is unclear which

type of regulation imposes an "absolute obstacle[ ] or severe limitation[ ]," especially given
thatJustice O'Connor rarely voted to strike down abortion regulations under this standard.

See Dorothy E. Roberts, Sandra Day O'Connor, Conservative Discourse, and Reproductive
Freedom, 13 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 95, 98 (1991).
168. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 537-60 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (joined byjustices Brennan and Marshall); id. at 560-72 (Stevens,J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part).
169. In fact, Webster's import was so unclear that both pro-life and pro-choice
advocates claimed it as a victory and as a defeat. For example, pro-choice advocates
acknowledged that Webster represented a small victory because it stopped short of
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Although four members of the Court believed in the fundamental nature
of that right, the remaining five members were only willing to accord it
something less than fundamental status.
2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey. - The Court's ambivalence about
the abortion right culminated in Casey, its most recent pronouncement
on the issue. In addition to the informed consent provision discussed
above, Casey involved several amendments to Pennsylvania's Abortion
70
Control Act of 1982, including a 24-hour waiting period requirement,
a parental consent provision,' 7 ' a spousal notification provision, 7 2 various reporting requirements, 173 and a definition of the term "medical
emergency."' 7 4 The Court had previously relied on Roe to strike down
several similar provisions. 175 Thus, Casey presented an opportunity not
only to reconsider those particular provisions but also to reconsider, and
possibly overrule, Roe.' 7 6 A majority of the Court agreed to uphold all
but one of the statutory provisions but, as in Webster, no majority agreed
on the rationale. Perhaps more significantly, only two of the Justices
overruling Roe. See Ruth Marcus, The Next Battleground on Abortion Rights: Groups
Focus on State Constitutions, Courts, Wash. PostJuly 10, 1989, atA4. However, pro-choice
advocates also conceded "the fragility of their claim [after Webster] that abortion has been
established as a 'right.'" Mary McGrory, The Uneasy Politics of Abortion, Wash. Post, June
10, 1990, at C1,C5. Similarly, some pro-life advocates initially hailed Webster as an "historic
ruling." Al Kamen, Supreme Court Restricts Right to Abortion, Giving States Wide
Latitude for Regulation: 5-4 Rulings Stops Short of Overturning 'Roe,' Wash. Post, July 4,
1989, at Al, A6. Nevertheless, some pro-life proponents cautioned that the decision "did
not fully recognize the right to life of the unborn child." Catholic Bishops' Reaction to
Supreme Court Ruling: Legislatures Urged to Restrict Abortion, L.A. Times, Aug. 12,
1989, § 2, at 6.
170. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3205 (Supp. 1995).
171. See id. § 3206.
172. See id. § 3209.
173. See id. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), (f).
174. See id. § 3203.
175. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-51 (1983)
(striking down informed consent provision, parental consent provision, and 24-hour
waiting period requirement); see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 765-68 (1986) (striking down reporting requirements).
176. The State of Pennsylvania as Respondent and the United States as Amicus Curiae
urged the Court to dispose of Roe altogether. See Brief of Respondent at 105, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902) ("[I]t remains true
that Roe is a deeply flawed decision, and it may be that the time has come to reconsider
it."); see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 ("Roe v.
Wade was wrongly decided and should be overruled.").
After the dissension in Webster, and with the appointment of Justice Thomas by
President Bush, the overruling of Roe was a distinct possibility. Although then-nominee
Thomas refused to state his position on abortion during his Senate confirmation hearings,
see Ruth Marcus, Abortion-Rights Groups Expect to Lose: Supreme Court Hears
Arguments Today in Pennsylvania Case, Wash. Post, April 22, 1992, at Al, A19, once
appointed to the Court, Thomas manifested his position on abortion by joining the
dissenting opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Scalia in Casey which called for the
overturning of Roe v. Wade. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2855, 2873
(1992).
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voted to maintain the fundamental status of the abortion right;17 7 the
remaining seven Justices did not elevate abortion to that status.
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, authors of the Casey joint
opinion, voted to uphold all but the spousal notification provision, but
nevertheless reaffirmed "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade." 178 Apparently, although never explicitly stated, they did not believe that Roe's "essential holding" embraced the notion of abortion as a fundamental right.
Significantly, the joint opinion began its reaffirmation of Roe with a
lengthy discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of "liberty";179 indeed, the word "liberty" appeared frequently throughout the
joint opinion's discussion of the abortion right.' 8 0 But the joint opinion
never once used the word "fundamental" to describe that liberty,' 8 ' even
though a significant aspect of Roe was its explicit recognition of the fundamental nature of the abortion right.' 8 2 The Justices' reluctance to describe the abortion right as fundamental suggests that they considered
that right to have less than fundamental status.
The joint opinion's abandonment of Roe's trimester framework further evidences the changed nature of the abortion right. Blaming Roe's
trimester framework for the Court's undervaluation of the state's interest
in potential life in cases following Roe, the joint opinion abandoned it in
177. Justices Blackmun and Stevens voted to uphold Roe in its entirety. See Casey, 112
S. Ct. at 2838-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2843-55
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in

part).
178. Id. at 2804. The joint opinion believed the essential holding of Roe had three
parts:
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.
Before viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to support a

prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's
effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State's
power to iestrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies which endanger a woman's life or health. And third is the principle
that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a
child.
Id.
179. See id. at 2804-08.
180. See, e.g., id. at 2804 ("The controlling word in the case before us is 'liberty.' ");
id. at 2808 ("It was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe sought to protect."); id. at
2810-11 ("Even on the assumption that the central holding of Roe was in error, that error
would go only to the strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not to the
recognition afforded by the Constitution to the woman's liberty."); id. at 2817 ("The
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is ...a rule of law and a
component of liberty we cannot renounce.").
181. See Clark, supra note 151, at 321 n.278 (noting that the word "fundamental"

appears only twice in the joint opinion and, in both cases, does not refer to the abortion
right).

182. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
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favor of the "undue burden" standard, 183 which gives greater weight to
the state's interest.184 Under this standard, state laws placing an undue
burden on a woman's right to abort prior to fetal viability are unconstitutional; absent such a burden, regulation of abortion is valid if reasonable. 185 Thus, the joint opinion's abandonment of the trimester framework-which was merely a way of expressing Roe's application of strict
scrutiny"-impliedly acknowledged that the abortion right no longer en186
joyed fundamental status.
The three authors of the joint opinion were not alone in their view
that abortion should be accorded less than fundamental status. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas went further
than the joint opinion's "undue burden" standard, voting to overturn Roe
and to subject regulations of abortion to rationality review. 187 As Justice
Rehnquist explained:
183. See Case, 112 S. Ct. at 2818-20. The Court defined "undue burden" as "a state
regulation that has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. at 2820. Some commentators, and
some of the Justices themselves, have noted that the undue burden standard articulated in
Casey is slightly different from those previously set forth. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2878-79
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that previous articulations of the "undue burden" standard
required that the obstacle to abortion be "absolute" or "severe" rather than merely
"substantial"); Howard, supra note 158, at 1491-92 (noting that Casey slightly relaxed
earlier versions of the "undue burden" standard). The authors of the joint opinion firmly
stated, however, "[W]e set out what in our view should be the controlling standard." Casey,
112 S.Ct. at 2820.
184. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2817 (Roe "establish[ed] not only the woman's liberty but
also the State's 'important and legitimate interest in potential life.' That portion of the
decision in Roe has been given too little acknowledgement and implementation by the
Court in its subsequent cases.") (citation omitted). The joint opinion specifically singled
out Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), as an example of
later Courts' misapplication of Roe. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2817.
185. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2821 ("Unless it [is a substantial obstacle to] her right of
choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be
upheld if reasonably related to that goal.").
186. Many scholars agree that the joint opinion's undue burden standard established
something less than strict protection of the abortion right. See G. Sidney Buchanan, A
Very Rational Court, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 1509, 1570 (1993) (noting that authors of the joint
opinion "rejected the close scrutiny analysis of Roe"); Clark, supra note 151, at 321 n.278
("By adopting the undue burden standard, which entails something less than strict scrutiny
analysis, the joint opinion abandoned at least implicitly Roe's holding that the right to
terminate a pregnancy is a fundamental right."); Sheldon Gelman, "Life" and "Liberty":
Their Original Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate
Over Abortion Rights, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 585, 607 (1994) (In creating the undue burden
standard, the joint opinion "seemingly confound[s] the distinction between strict scrutiny
and rationality review."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 TermForeword: The justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. I Rev. 22, 34 n.70 (1992)
(noting that the joint opinion's undue burden standard engaged in "quantitative
assessments . . . usually associated with intermediate rather than strict standards of
scrutiny").
187. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2855 ("We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that
it can and should be overruled .... We would adopt the approach of the plurality in
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[T]he Constitution does not subject state abortion regulations
to heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, we think that the correct
analysis is that set forth by the plurality opinion in Webster. A
woman's interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate aborin ways rationally related to a legitimate state
tion procedures
88
interest.'
Using rationality review, the Justices voted to uphold all of the challenged
found to be unduly
provisions, even the spousal notification provision
89
burdensome by the authors of the joint opinion.'
The authors of the joint opinion and the Justices joining the
Rehnquist concurrence formed an uneasy alliance-their seven votes
combined to uphold all portions of the Pennsylvania statute except the
spousal notification provision. 190 Furthermore, this alliance went beyond
Webster (which merely upheld the Missouri statute) to overrule prior precedent.' 9 1 Thus, Casey not only continued, but cemented, Websters trend
away from Roe. The unmistakable conclusion after Webster and Casey is
that, although they cannot agree on the exact nature of the abortion
right, seven of the nine Justices believe that it is no longer fundamental.
This view of abortion had a significant impact on the Court's treatment of
the First Amendment issues in Rust and Casey.
B. Abortion as a Vice Activity
Once one recognizes the implications of the Court's recent abortion
jurisprudence, the Rust and Casey Courts' use of the Posadas"greater includes lesser" rationale becomes easier to understand. The PosadasCourt
reasoned that Puerto Rico could regulate casino advertising under a lenient Due Process standard because such advertising was essentially part
and parcel of the economic activity of gambling. Similarly, the Court's
recent willingness to view abortion as less than a fundamental right may
have spurred it to equate abortion and abortion counseling. Of course,
after Casey, regulations of abortion are not subject to mere rationality reWebster and uphold the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute in their
entirety.") (citation omitted).
188. Id. at 2867 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
189. See id. at 2867-73.
190. The three authors of the joint opinion, who believed this provision to be unduly
burdensome, see id. at 2826-31, combined with Justices Stevens and Blackmun, who
believed that the provision was unconstitutional under Roe, see id. at 2838-43 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) and id. at 2843-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part), to create a 5-4 majority
striking down the provision.
191. The Casey joint opinion joined the Rehnquist camp and expressly overruled
Akron and Thornburgh to the extent they were inconsistent with Casey's recognition that the

24-hour waiting period, informed consent provision, and reporting requirements were
constitutional. See id. at 2816-17, 2822-26.
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view as are regulations of gambling.' 92 Given abortion's higher position
in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, one could argue that Posadashad
no place in Casey and Rust. However, the nature of the "undue burden"
standard is vague at best, leaving judges to interpret it in whatever manner they see fit.' 9 3 Thus, abortion may be much more like gambling than

the "undue burden" standard facially implies.
Perhaps more important to understanding the resurgence of
Posadas'sreasoning in Rust and Casey is the special nature of gambling
and, arguably, abortion as vice activities. The Posadas Court clearly
viewed gambling as a "vice" 19 4 activity rather than a run-of-the-mill economic activity.' 95 Moreover, that aspect of Posadas-theidea that gambling is different-likely drove the majority's opinion.' 9 6 Abortion, too,
is different. Unlike much routine economic activity, it has serious moral
and ethical implications. It is an activity that many people find abhorrent
and corrupt.197 Thus, many people are more likely to equate abortion
192. Thejoint opinion's undue burden standard, while arguably stripping abortion of
fundamental status, at least facially establishes something more than rational basis reviewprobably something more akin to an intermediate standard of review. See supra note 186.

193. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that the undue burden standard "will conceal raw judicial

policy choices concerning what is 'appropriate' abortion legislation").
194. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986).

195. One could argue that the Court previously faced the problem of vice activities
and free speech without resurrecting Posadas. For example, cases involving the regulation
of nude dancing, see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), or adult movie
theaters, see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), arguably presented vice
issues. Such cases, however, are different from Posadas,Rust, and Casey. In the latter cases,
the issue before the Court was how to treat speech related to a vice activity. In the former
cases, the vice activity (e.g., nude dancing) is also the speech or expression. Thus, in
Barnes and Young, the Court could not and did not forego First Amendment analysis by
subsuming the speech into a separate activity as the Posadas,Rust, and Casey Courts did.
196. Professor Epstein has noted that Posadasprobably "should be understood not as
an ordinary commercial speech case, but as a police power morals case.... [It] should
stand only for the proposition that constitutional protection of speech is at its lowest ebb in
the morals cases." Epstein, supra note 20, at 67. Similarly, Professor Kurland has
suggested that the Posadas majority might have "intended to further a new moral code,
which tolerates government restraint not only on speech that is conducive to illegal
behavior but also on speech that may lead to immoral though legal conduct." Kurland,
supra note 113, at 15.
197. People have widely divergent reasons for believing that abortion poses serious
moral and ethical problems. Many abhor abortion largely based upon their religious
beliefs that it is morally corrupt or akin to murder. See Timothy A. Byrnes and Mary C.
Segers, Introduction, in The Catholic Church and the Politics of Abortion 2-4 (Timothy A.
Byrnes & Mary C. Segers eds., 1992); John W. Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and
Operation Rescue: A Historical and Theoretical Analysis, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 77,
89-92 (1991). Others argue that abortion is inherently a moral issue. These people,
including some feminists, criticize the courts for basing their reasoning in abortion cases in
vindicating rights and bodily autonomy, and as a result, ignoring the moral issues of
abortion. See Kathleen McDonnell, Not An Easy Choice: A Feminist Re-Examines
Abortion 42-57 (1984); Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue:
Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 923, 931-38 (1991). Still others adhere to
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with vice activities such as gambling or prostitution than with mundane
economic activities, like running a pharmacy or an optical shop.' 98
Supreme Court Justices are not immune from such personal views.
As a portion of the Court has indicated, "Some of us as individuals find
abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality." 9 9 Numerous scholars have noted that such personal views inform judicial decisionmaking despite the continuing belief that judges are neutral arbiters of
justice. 20 0 One could conclude, then, that abortion's potential position
as a vice activity in some Justices' eyes affected the outcomes in Rust and
Casey20 1 despite the joint opinion's protests otherwise. 20 2 The Court's explicit approval of government attempts to discourage the exercise of the
abortion right 20 3 lends further credence to the concept that the Court
views abortion as something other than mundane economic activity.
anti-abortion views because of their belief that women and men are intrinsically different
and that abortion interferes with men's and women's traditional roles. See David M.
Smolin, Why Abortion Rights Are Not Justified by Reference to Gender Equality: A
Response to Professor Tribe, 23 J. Marshall L. Rev. 621, 634-41 (1990); see also Faye D.
Ginsburg, Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community 212-18
(1989) (arguing that abortion is a part of the struggle over competing notions of women's
roles in society). For an excellent survey of competing views on abortion, see Sylvia A.Law,
Abortion Compromise-Inevitable and Impossible, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 921, 933-37.
198. Even after Rust and Casey, abortion, unlike gambling, cannot be made illegal.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) ("Before viability, the
State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition on abortion ....").
Nevertheless, many people would like it to be. The Catholic Church, for example, has
long stated that its goals regarding abortion include gaining constitutional protection for
the life of the unborn child and reversing all Supreme Court decisions that impede that
goal. See Byrnes & Segers, supra note 197, at 15-16. Similarly, Randall Terry, the leader
of Operation Rescue, a nationally organized anti-abortion group, has stated that the
group's rescue efforts are an attempt to overburden the legal system to convince the
government to "mak[e] abortion illegal again." Michael Matza, Throw This Man In Jail,
Phila. Inquirer, June 26, 1988, Features Inquirer Magazine, at 21.
199. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2806.
200. See generallyJeffrey A.Segal &HaroldJ. Spaeth, The Supreme Court And The
Attitudinal Model 64-73 (1993) (arguing that Supreme Court decisionmaking is best
explained by reference to judges' attitudes toward issues rather than strict adherence to

legal principles); HaroldJ. Spaeth &Stuart H. Teger, Activism and Restraint: A Cloak for
the Justices' Policy Preferences, in Supreme Court Activism and Restraint 277, 278

(Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982) (suggesting that judges allow
personal preferences to guide certain judicial decisions, such as the decision to exercise
judicial deference).
201. The view of abortion as akin to a vice activity may explain Professor Berg's
concern that the Court has not formulated a coherent First Amendment theory pertaining
to medical counseling. See Berg, supra note 10, at 205. As Professor Berg notes, Rust and
Casey are the only two cases in which the Court has had the opportunity to consider the

free speech implications of medical counseling. See id. at 204-05. Perhaps if the Court
had confronted medical counseling in a situation not involving a vice activity, it would have
formulated a coherent First Amendment theory. In other words, the Court was unable to
develop such a theory precisely because Rust and Casey involved abortion.

202. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2806.
203. The Caseyjoint opinion, for example, reiterated that the state may take measures
to discourage abortion. See id. at 2821 ("[A] state measure designed to persuade [a
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That other courts have refused to apply Rust outside of the abortion
context also supports my argument that the vice aspects of abortion drove
the Rust and Casey decisions. For example, some lower courts have struck
down restrictions on funding for scientific research 20 4 and artistic
projects, 20 5 distinguishing Rust as inapplicable to their situation. Additionally, although the Fourth Circuit in Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia20 6 upheld a public university's denial of student
activity funds to student religious groups, it did so by focusing primarily
on the university's desire to avoid an Establishment Clause violation. The
Fourth Circuit could have used Rust to dismiss the petitioners' First
Amendment argument, claiming that selective funding of specific groups
falls within the university's discretion to allocate its funds. Instead, the
Fourth Circuit searched for a "compelling" interest-which it found in
the university's fear of entanglement with religion-to justify selective exclusion from student funds.20 7 Significantly, the Supreme Court recently
reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Rosenberger, finding that the denial of funds constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination under
woman] to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that
goal."); id. ("To promote the State's profound interest in potential life, throughout
pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that a woman's choice is informed, and
measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose
is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.").
204. See Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp.
472, 478-79 (D.D.C. 1991) (striking down federal government regulation conditioning
receipt of government funds for scientific research on grantee's agreement to submit all
research results to government for publication approval). The Sullivan court made
explicit its disapproval of the Rust decision:
The Rust decision opened the door to government review and suppression of
speech and publications in areas which had theretofore been widely thought
immune from such intrusion ....This Court, like all lower courts, is of course
bound by the Rust decision. But... the Court will not, without explicit appellate
direction, further narrow the speech and expression rights of citizens and
organizations, or subject to government censorship the publications of
institutions of higher learning and others engaged in legitimate research.
Id. at 478.
205. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1470 (C.D.
Cal. 1992) (ruling unconstitutional statute requiring that government grants for artistic
endeavors "tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency"); see also Bella
Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 785 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (refusing to
uphold NEA requirement that grant recipients pledge not to create "obscene" works).
206. 18 F.3d 269, 281-86 (4th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995).
207. See id. In justifying its search for a "compelling" interest, the Fourth Circuit
relied on Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987), which held that
the government can condition the receipt of certain government benefits based upon the
content of speech only when the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id. at 231. Given that Rust is a more
recent unconstitutional conditions precedent and also provides the simplest method for
denying the petitioners' claims, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on R~gand, which applies a
more stringent standard of scrutiny to speech regulations, was odd, to say the least.
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the First Amendment and specifically distinguishing Rust.208 That the
outcome of these cases did not depend upon the Rust Court's reasoning
reveals that Rust was less about unconstitutional conditions than it was
about abortion.
C. DistinguishingBetween Counseling and Protest

There is a response to my argument that the driving force behind
Rust and Casey was the Court's inability to distinguish between abortion
and abortion-related speech. One need only point to several recent decisions in the abortion protest context which arguably belie my assertion.
Just last year in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 20 9 for example, the
Court upheld portions of an injunction against abortion protesters, ruling that they did not violate the First Amendment.2 10 Similarly, the Court
in Frisby v. Schultz2 11 upheld against First Amendment challenges a time,
place, and manner regulation aimed at abortion protestors. 21 2 In both
cases, the Court recognized obvious free speech issues and analyzed them
accordingly, 213 thus potentially casting doubt on my argument.
208. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2518-19. For a discussion and criticism of the
Rosenberger majority's explanation of the differences between Rust and Rosenberger, see
supra note 42.
209. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
210. See id. at 2530.
211. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
212. See id. at 488.
213. Both Madsen and Frisby generated a fair amount of dissent on the Court. In
Madsen the Court disagreed about the standard of review to apply to a content-neutral
injunction against anti-abortion protestors. The majority recognized that injunctions carry
.greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do general ordinances,"
but refused to reject the injunction out of hand. 114 S. Ct. at 2524. Instead, the Court
reviewed the injunction to determine whether it "burden[ed] no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant government interest." Id. at 2525. Justice Stevens
dissented, arguing that the injunction should be reviewed under a more lenient standard
than legislation. See id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia, also dissenting, argued that the injunction was "at least as deserving of strict
scrutiny as a statutory, content-based restriction." Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Frisby addressed the constitutionality of an ordinance prohibiting picketing "before or
about" any residence. 487 U.S. at 477. The majority upheld the content-neutral ordinance
because it was "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and [left] open
ample alternative channels of communication." Id. at 481 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). Justice Brennan, on the other hand,
would have upheld only controls on the size, time, and volume of the picketers. See id. at
496 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also argued that the ordinance was overly
broad and would have upheld only those ordinances directed at "conduct that
unreasonably interferes with the privacy of the home and does not serve a reasonable
communicative purpose." Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This Article does not presume to discuss the correctness of the decisions in either
Madsen or Frisby; rather, it cites them for the proposition that the Court at least recognized
the First Amendment issues therein.
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Madsen and Fisby, however, involved far different situations from
those in Rust and Casey. The former cases involved abortion protests while
the latter involved abortion counseling. Protests of any kind raise classic
free speech issues. 2 14 They are almost inherently "political" speech,
which is at the core of the First Amendment.21 5 Thus, even though the
Madsen and Frisby protests related to abortion, the political nature of the
speech involved made obvious the First Amendment implications. Abortion counseling, on the other hand, is more closely related to the act of
abortion itself and has no exterior trappings to make it obviously political
speech. While the more private nature of abortion counseling does not
make it any less speech, 2 16 it does explain how the Court subsumed abortion counseling, but not abortion protests, into the activity of abortion.
In fact, the PosadasCourt essentially foretold the distinction between
political speech about a vice activity (abortion protest) and speech integrally related to that activity (abortion counseling). As part of its reasoning, the Posadasmajority read Puerto Rico's ban as applying only to direct
advertisements of gambling rather than to speech that might incidentally
touch on or encourage such gambling. The former, according to the
PosadasCourt, was simply part of the economic activity of gambling and,
therefore, not subject to First Amendment scrutiny; the latter fell within
the legitimate protection of the First Amendment.2 1 7 That reasoning incorporated into the abortion counseling context leaves us with two distinct categories of cases. On the one hand we have Rust and Casey, which
viewed abortion counseling as equivalent to direct advertising of gambling and a problem involving the regulation of a vice activity. On the
other hand we have Madsen and Frisby, which viewed abortion protests for
what they were-speech and expression protected by the First
Amendment.
214. Several Supreme Court decisions recognize the right of citizens to gather and

express their views. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112-18 (1969)
(reversing convictions of individuals prosecuted for gathering to protest segregation); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,557-58 (1965) (same); Edwards v. South Carolina, 872 U.S. 229,
237-38 (1963) (same). Such gatherings "reflect an exercise of ... basic constitutional
rights in their most pristine and classic form." Edwards, 372 U.S. at 285.
215. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 488 (1988) ("Political

speech, we have often noted, is at the core of the First Amendment."); Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (clause prohibiting the display of protest signs within 500 feet of an
embassy "operates at the core of the First Amendment by prohibiting petitioners from
engaging in classically political speech"); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45
(1976) (limitations on "core First Amendment rights of political expression" must satisfy
"exacting" scrutiny).
216. See supra Part I.C.
217. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 828, 340 n.7 (1986)
("The narrowing construction of the statute and regulations announced by the Superior
Court effectively ensures that the advertising restrictions cannot be used to inhibit either
the freedom of the press in Puerto Rico to report on any aspect of casino gambling, or the
freedom of anyone, including casino owners, to comment publicly on such matters as
legislation relating to casino gambling.").
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CONCLUSION

The Rust and Casey Courts, like the Posadas Court before them, simply got the free speech issue wrong. If the First Amendment stands for
anything, it stands for the principle that the government cannot "deliberately deny[ ] information to people for the purpose of influencing their
behavior."2 18 If the government wishes to restrict gambling or abortion,
it should do so. Such paternalistic actions are generally within its police
powers. Banning speech in order to manipulate citizens' behavior in accordance with the government's notions of morality, however, is antithetical to notions of autonomy and self-realization underlying the First
Amendment's protection of speech. 2 19 Outside of the abortion counseling and gambling advertising contexts, the Court has recognized the dangers of such manipulation. At the very least it has recognized that speech
issues were involved. Because abortion and gambling pose particularly
divisive issues regarding regulation of vice activities, however, the Court
has been less willing to extend First Amendment protection to speech
related to those activities. But speech is no less speech merely because it
is related to a vice activity. Had the Court recognized that fact, it might
have taken a more straightforward approach to the speech issues in Rust
and Casey. An approach that acknowledged the free speech implications
of abortion counseling and that engaged in meaningful First Amendment
analysis would have strengthened the decisions in those cases, regardless
of their outcome. Hiding behind the "greater includes lesser" rationale
in cases involving speech integral to vice activity simply made the Court
look result-oriented and weak.

218. Strauss, supra note 123, at 355; see also supra note 93 (discussing autonomy as a
fundamental value that the First Amendment seeks to protect). Professor Strauss terms
this concept the "persuasion principle." Strauss, supra note 123, at 335. A number of the

Court's decisions embody the "persuasion principle." See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) ("It is

precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the
dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.");

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1971) (rejecting notion that "[s]tates, acting as
guardians of public morality, may properly remove ...offensive word[s] from the public
vocabulary"); see also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First

Amendment, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 449, 460 (1985) ("The communication of a fact or value
judgment relating to a matter of public concern cannot be prohibited solely on the ground

that the communication ... erodes moral standards.").
219. Professor Strauss argues that autonomy-based considerations best justify the

persuasion principle. In his view, attempts by the government to manipulate information
"infringe human autonomy ...by, in part, taking over [people's] thinking processes."
Strauss, supra note 123, at 356.
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